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I. INTRODUCTION 
The genius of the common law has been its ability to respond to 
and to reflect both the temper and the needs of the times. As Justice 
Cardozo pointed out,1 the customs and mores of the times and the 
objective of serving society's needs are often as important as logic and 
history in deciding cases which "count for the future."2 Indeed, 
Cardozo's own decision in the landmark case of McPherson v. Buick 
Motor CO.3 and the line of cases which preceded it have long beeri held 
out as the paradigm of how the common law moves to keep in step 
with the changes in community perspectives and needs! It is not 
particularly surprising, therefore, that the Hawaii Supreme Court also 
recognizes that "[ t ]he adaptability of the common law to the changing 
needs of passing time has been one of its most beneficent characteris-
tics. "5 
The changes experienced in the United States following World War 
II-the rapid and vast growth of science, industry, technology, and 
merchandising and the relative weakening of the ability of the individual 
consumer to cope with the rapid increase of risks to health, body, and 
pocketbook-brought with them a corresponding sympathetic response 
from the common law courts. Led by the great chief justice of the 
California Supreme Court, Roger Traynor,6 and buttressed by the 
I B. N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
2 Finally there remains a percentage [of cases) ... where a decision one way 
or the other, will count for the future, will advance or retard, sometimes much, 
sometimes little, the development of the law. These are the cases where the 
creative element in the judicial process finds its opportunity and power .... In 
a sense it is true of many of them that they might be decided either way. By 
that I mean that reasons plausible and fairly persuasive might be found for one 
conclusion as for another. Here comes into play that balancing of judgment, 
that testing and sorting of considerations of analogy and logic and utility and 
fairness, which I have been trying to describe. Here it is that the judge assumes 
the function of a lawgiver. 
/d. at 165-66. 
, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). McPherson eliminated the requirement of privity of 
contract in negligence actions between consumers and manufacturers. It has led to the 
elimination of the privity requirement in virtually all product liability actions. 
• E. LEVI, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1961). 
$ Johnston v. KFC Nat'l Mgt. Co., 71 Haw. 229, 233, 788 P.2d 159, 162 (1990) 
(quoting with approval Ely v. Murphy, 540 A.2d 54, 57 (Conn. 1988) (quoting Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Bill, 111 A.2d 4, 8 (Conn. 1955»). 
6 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 456, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, 
J. concurring). 
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reasoning and support of leading tort scholars, such as Leon Green 
and William Prosser, as well as the general influence of distinguished 
proponents of a policy-oriented approach, such as Yale's Myers 
McDougal and Harold Lasswell, the common law courts with no help 
from the legislative branches created a virtual revolution in tort law. 
The special features of this revolution included these: 
(1) A general belief that individuals were virtually powerless to 
protect themselves from risks created by the dangerous modern envi-
ronment; 
(2) A general belief that industrial firms and manufacturers were in 
the best position to reduce the risks they created-they were the 
"cheapest cost avoiders"7-and could be made to reduce these risks if 
they were held responsible for the costs of injuries their activities 
produced; 
(3) A general belief that industry and other accident causers, rather 
than accident victims, could absorb and shift the costs of accidents 
more efficiently, without serious adverse effects, by purchasing liability 
msurance; 
(4) A widespread agreement that, at least in the area of injuries 
caused by manufactured products, fault need not be a requirement of 
liability; and 
(5) A sense, not always clearly articulated, that compensation of 
injury victims should be a central purpose, rather than a by-product, 
of the tort system. 
Starting mainly in the 1960s, these views led to a series of common 
law decisions which, among other things, (1) imposed strict, non-fault 
liability on manufacturers for injuries produced by their defectively 
manufactured or designed products; (2) tended to reject no-duty or 
other limiting rules in negligence cases and thereby to expand general 
negligence theory to apply to many areas where courts had heretofore 
been unwilling to extend liability; (3) eased proof requirements for 
injured victims; (4) reduced the impact of the victim's own failure to 
use ordinary care or evident willingness to accept the risk which caused 
injury; and (5) tended to expand the availability of insurance proceeds 
to cover accident losses by penalizing insurers who wrongly refused to 
settle claims. The California cases which led these trends are familiar 
to all tort lawyers: Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 8 (announcing 
7 G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
8 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962). An equally influential and well-known forerunner to 
Greenman was Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
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strict product liability) and Barker v. Lull Engineering CO.9 (adopting strict 
liability for design defects); Dillon v. LeggIO (extending liability for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress to persons not within the zone 
of physical danger) and Rowland v. Christian I I (eliminating no-duty rules 
applicable to liability for negligence of possessors of land to licensees 
and trespassers); Ybarra v. SpangartfP (allowing unconscious hospital 
patient to recover unless hospital personnel prove that they did not 
cause patient's injury) and Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories l3 (allowing "mar-
ket share" liability where victim cannot prove which of several com-
panies producing the same drug produced the particular drug which 
caused her injury); Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 14 (adopting pure comparative 
negligence); Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. IS (holding liability insurer 
liable for tort damages to policyholder for negligent failure to settle 
within policy limits); and Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court l6 
(holding liability insurer liable for tort damages to accident victim for 
bad faith refusal to settle). 
During a period which followed most of these developments in 
California by about four or five years, much of which coincided with 
the tenure of William S. Richardson as Chief Justice of the Hawaii 
Supreme Court, 17 a somewhat similar revolution took place in the 
Hawaii Supreme Court. While the Hawai'i cases may have been 
triggered by cases such as those just described, both from California 
and other states undergoing changes with similar effects, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court did not slavishly follow the California courts. Here are 
the principal decisions which epitomized the tort revolution in Hawai'i: 
In Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 18 the Hawaii Supreme Court 
adopted the doctrine of strict products liability in tort. Further, in 
addition to a very liberal use of circumstantial evidence, the court in 
Stewart went a long way toward reducing the plaintiff's burden of proof 
9 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). 
10 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). 
II 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
12 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944). 
13 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), em. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). 
It 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975) . 
.. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967). 
16 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979) rev'd, Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 
P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988). 
17 William S. Richardson was appointed and qualified as Chief Justice of the Hawaii 
Supreme Court March 25, 1966. He served as Chief Justice until his retirement on 
December 30, 1982. 
18 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970) (Levinson, J.). 
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in cases where the product is destroyed by suggesting, in a footnote, 
that "[i]n the most extreme circumstances a court might hold that 
where no specific defect can be shown, recovery is to be allowed 
anyway as a carefully driven vehicle does not leave the road in the 
absence of a defect in the car." 19 This comes close to a doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur for strict liability. 
In Rodrigues v. State2° the Richardson Court leaped out in front of 
the entire nation and adopted an independent tort of negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, applicable even to cases where plaintiff's distress 
was caused by negligent injury to property and untrammeled by 
limitations imposed on the cause of action by other state courts. The 
only significant limitations on the tort are that the foreseeable distress 
has to be serious and that the plaintiff has to be within a reasonable 
distance of the accident that caused the distress. 21 
In Pickard v. City & County oj Honolulu22 the court, like the California 
court in Rowland v. Christian,23 extended the negligence principle by 
refusing to apply traditional liability-limiting rules to the liability of 
possessors of land and instead held that "an occupier of land has a 
duty to use reasonable care for the safety of all persons reasonably 
anticipated to be on the premises, regardless of the legal status of the 
individual.' '24 
In Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processini5 the court approved "pure" com-
parative negligence for strict product liabil~ty cases even though Ha-
wai'i's comparative negligence statute provides for a form of "modified" 
comparative negligence. 26 
Although the Richardson Court never had to decide whether to adopt 
actions, such as those permitted in California in Criscr?7 and in Royal 
19 /d. at 76 n.5, 470 P.2d 244 n.5. 
20 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (Richardson, C.J.). 
21 Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply Inc., 56 Haw. 204, 209, 532 P.2d 673, 676 
(1975) (Kobayashi, J .); see generally Richard S. Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent 
Infliction of El1Wtional Distress: Malcing "the Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 1 (1979). 
22 51 Haw. 134,452 P.2d 445 (1969) (Richardson, C.J.). 
23 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); see supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
2. 51 Haw. at 135, 452 P.2d at 446. 
2$ 65 Haw. 447, 654 P. 2d 343 (1982) (Ogata, J.). Although there was some question 
whether Kaneko had adopted "pure" comparative fault, that question was finally put 
to rest by Chief Justice Lum's opinion in Hao v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 69 Haw. 236, 
738 P.2d 416 (1987). 
26 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1984). 
27 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967); see supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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Globe,28 which hold insurers liable for wrongful failure to settle within 
policy limits (perhaps because insurers saw to it that such cases never 
came before the court), the court, in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Morgan,29 
demonstrated a policy favoring expansion of availability of insurance 
proceeds for accident victims by requiring stacking of uninsured mo-
torists coverage. 30 
One last example of the Richardson Court's joinder with the main-
land's progressive trend of extending the negligence principle is the 
case of Ono v. Applegate,31 in which the court broke with a long tradition 
and held that a bar could be held liable to an accident victim of a bar 
patron who was negligently served liquor, in violation of statute, while 
intoxicated.32 
It would not have been a surprise to anyone following the recent 
political history of Hawai'i that the Richardson Court would adopt a 
most liberal and activist posture in its decisions. 33 Following years of 
domination by the "Big Five" and conservative business interests, 
Hawai'i's governmental structure shifted into the hands of the liberal 
Democrats and their supporters, mostly Hawai'i's working people and 
those who had come from a plantation background, with the election 
28 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979), rev'd, Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 
P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988); see supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
29 59 Haw. 44, 575 P.2d 477 (1978) (Ogata, J.). 
'" /d. at 49, 575 P.2d at 479. In Morgan, Insured's father had three vehicles, each 
covered by uninsured motorist coverage. Insured was injured by an uninsured motorist 
while a passenger in another vehicle. /d. at 46, 575 P.2d at 478. The court held that 
she was entitled to "stack" the uninsured motorist coverages on each of the other 
three vehicles to cover her injuries. She also recovered under the uninsured motorist 
provision of the car in which she was a passenger. /d. at 49, 575 P.2d at 478. 
" 62 Haw. 131,612 P.2d 533 (1980) (Ogata, J.). 
32 /d. at 133, 612 P.2d at 534. The traditional rule was that the patron's driving, 
and not the service of alcoholic beverages by the tavern, was the proximate cause of 
the accident. This bit of foolishness was also rejected by the California Supreme Court 
before the Hawaii Supreme Court decided Ono; see Vesely v. Sager, 486 P.2d 151 
(Cal. 1917); but see CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE § 25602 (1985). 
" See, e.g., Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Haw. 150, 155 n.7, 433 P.2d 220, 223 
n.7 (1967) (Levinson, J.): 
Where reform is necessary in the area of tort law, the court should act whereever 
possible and leave to the legislature the question whether the reform should be 
modified or rescinded in whole or in part. Judicial action is frequently necessary 
to overcome legislative inertia. 
/d., (citing Robert Keeton, Judicial Law Reform-A Perspective on the Performance of 
Appellate Courts, 45 TEX. L. REV. 1254, 1263 (1966)). 
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of Governor John Burns in 1962.34 In the early years of the new 
Democratic administration, Professor Stephan Riesenfeld, a distin-
guished law professor at Berkeley, was brought to Hawai'i to help 
draft the nation's most progressive legislation providing medical care 
and disability income to Hawai'i's workers.35 William S. Richardson, 
who served as Lieutenant Governor under John Burns, was appointed 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was thus put 
in the hands of a Chief Justice who was committed to serve the 
common people. Tort decisions following the most liberal trends, as 
well as other decisions which provided important benefits to the ordi-
nary citizen, such as In re Ashford,36 which expanded public access to 
Hawai'i's beaches, ought not to have been unexpected. 
The current Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice 
Lum, is a product of the very same political heritage as the Richardson 
Court. There has been no significant change in the political control of 
the State. If anything, the Democrats who have descended from the 
Burns regime are stronger now than they were when William Richard-
son was appointed to the court. At the legislative and executive level 
they have demonstrated their progressivism by adopting, for example, 
the nation's most encompassing health care legislation, providing almost 
universal health insurance for Hawai'i citizens. Unlike the early Ri-
chardson Court, all the members of the current court have been 
appointed by nomination of a Judicial Selection Commission, by ap-
pointment of a governor, and by the consent of a Senate, all of which 
strongly reflect the recent Democratic tradition. 37 On this basis alone 
one might have expected the court to continue on in its progressive 
direction. 
But another phenomenon, which started in the mid-1970s, reached 
new heights during the early 1980s, and which has continued with 
considerable force through to the present, has been the conservative 
movement for tort and insurance "reform." Insurance companies, 
businesses, physicians, governmental entities, non-profit organizations, 
and now even unions, alone or in various combinations, along with 
34 See generally LAWRENCE FUCHS, HAWAII PONO 263-353 (1961). 
" Act 116, 1963 Haw. Sess. Laws (codified at HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 386 
(1963)). 
3. 50 Haw. 452, 440 P.2d 76 (1968). 
37 See generally HAW. CONST. art. IV; STATE OF HAWAII, RULES OF THE JUDICIAL 
SELECTION COMMISSION; see also James E.T. Koshiba, Judicial Selection and Retention in 
the State of Hawaii, 20 HAW. B. J. 1 (1986). 
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elected and appointed governmental officials at the highest levels of the 
federal government,38 have sought to reduce or limit litigation, to 
reduce or limit lawyers fees associated with litigation, to cap tort 
recoveries, to eliminate punitive damages, to constrain products liabil-
ity, and generally to impose restrictions designed to reduce the number 
and the levels of success of tort actions. The volume of literature 
seeking such changes has grown exponentially over recent years, and 
not just a few respected legal academics have joined in on the attacks 
upon the tort system and in calls for both major and minor changes. 39 
This is not the place to evaluate the accuracy of the charges that 
have been placed against the tort and insurance system. Suffice it to 
say that such independent studies as there are suggest that much of 
the national outcry has been based upon exaggerated claims of a 
"litigation explosion" and exaggerated claims of the adverse effects of 
tort claims. 4O While costs of the tort system have increased and the 
size of a small percentage of damage awards have increased enormously, 
and while there may be individual pockets where there are serious 
problems,41 and other areas where improvement is possible, the overall 
system is by no means in crisis. 42 
Nevertheless, unrelenting and often well-orchestrated and well-funded 
attacks by respected individuals and groups on various facets of the 
38 See, e.g., Vice President Dan Quayle, Keynote Speech at the 1991 Annual 
Meeting of the American Bar Association (August, 1991) (calling for, among other 
things, requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence for awards of punitive 
damages; letting trial judges, rather than juries, determine the amount of punitive 
damages; limiting the amount of punitive damages to the amount of compensatory 
damages awarded; and adopting the "English rule" whereby the losing party to a 
lawsuit pays the winning party's attorney's fees); see also Daniel Broder, Quayle Charges 
Some Lawyers Are "Ripping Off the System," WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1991, at A3. For an 
earlier example of federal efforts to put controls on the tort system see U.S. ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 
(1986). 
39 See, e.g., Symposium: Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory, 73 CAL. L. 
REV. 548 (1985); STEPHEN SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 
(1989); George Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis, 96 YALE L. J. 1521 (1987). 
40 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Beyond the Litigation Panic, 37 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 
18 (1988) . 
• , Such as the senior author of this article believes is true of the automobile no-
fault situation in Hawai'i. 
.2 Cj, 1 PAUL WEILER, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE REPORTER'S STUDY, ENTERPRISE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY, THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE TORT CRISIS, 3-52 (1991). 
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tort and insurance system coupled with vicious attacks on the tort 
plaintiffs bar must undoubtedly have begun to affect community 
attitudes and to change community perspectives. This has surely oc-
curred notwithstanding attempts to counterattack by the well-organized 
plaintiffs' lawyers and by consumer advocates,43 such as Ralph Nader. 
Thus, it could have been predicted that decisionmakers in our demo-
cratic society would begin eventually to respond positively to what they 
may have perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be a shift in community 
attitudes with regard to alleged excesses of the tort and insurance 
system. 44 
Indeed, the Hawaii Legislature has clearly felt the need to respond, 
but in keeping with its liberal Democratic roots and traditions, has so 
far managed very successfully either to adopt changes which may be 
effective in reducing costs and excluding non-meritorious actions but 
which do not significantly limit suits, recoveries or damages, or changes 
which create a mere appearance of reform and which impose only the 
narrowest of limits on tort recoveries. Thus, for example, the legislature 
required plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions to present their cases 
to a purely advisory and non-binding panel, the Medical Claims 
Conciliation Panel, before bringing suit against medical professionals. 45 
More recently, following the Hawaii Supreme Court's lead, the legis-
lature has required all plaintiffs in tort actions in which the claim is 
$150,000 or less to bring the claim to arbitration46 before commencing 
a lawsuit. While it is very difficult to develop a research methodology 
which will determine, definitively, whether these "alternative modes of 
dispute resolution" have cut litigation costs or reduced the number of 
lawsuits, there are indications that both have indeed achieved some 
success. 47 
., See, e.g., The Manufactured Crisis, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 1986, at 544 . 
.. See H. JONES, j. KERNOCHAN & A. MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD: CASES AND TEXT 
MATERIALS 742 (1980): 
/d. 
If sociological jurisprudence has a message for today and tomorrow, it may be 
that those who have the power and responsibility for the resolution of competing 
social interests reach the soundest decisions when they listen-really listen, which 
is the hardest thing in the world for a law-trained person to do-to the inevitably 
extreme demands of all the contending social factions and then strive for the 
way of "tolerable" adjustment and ultimate social reconciliation. 
's HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-12 (1984). This approach was later applied also to other 
claims against other professionals. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 672-4 (1985) (architects) . 
• 6 HAW. REV. STAT. § 601-20 (1986) . 
• 7 See, e.g., john Barkai & Gene Kassebaum, The Impact of Discovery Limitations on 
Cost, Satisfaction and Pace in Court-Annexed Arbitration, 11 U. HAW. L. REV. 81 (1989). 
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Examples of the other kind of reform include prohibiting the inclusion 
of an ad damnum clause in medical malpractice complaints,4S largely 
to avoid adverse media publicity when the suit is filed; prohibiting 
awards of damages for emotional distress arising out of injuries to 
property unless the emotional' distress results in "physical injury to 
mental illness;' '49 and abolishing joint and several liability with regard 
only to noneconomic losses and then evidently only in malpractice 
actions and motor vehicle accidents as to tortfeasors who are less than 
twenty-five percent at fault in causing claimant's injury.5o Perhaps the 
most interesting example of legislative tort reform is the provision 
which caps awards of pain and suffering at $375,000.51 First, this 
provision probably only applies to professional malpractice cases, since 
it expressly does not apply to the fairly comprehensive list of tort 
actions mentioned in the section which purports to abolish joint and 
several liabilityY The more interesting feature, however, is a separate 
section defining noneconomic damages, which lists several types of 
such damages "which are recoverable in tort actions," and which states 
that pain and suffering is only one such type. 53 Thus, not only do 
other forms of noneconomic loss remain recoverable without limitation 
in malpractice cases but the statute explicitly does what the Hawaii 
Supreme Court had yet to do: it made controversial hedonic damages-
damages for loss of enjoyment of life-recoverable along with mental 
anguish, disfigurement, loss of consortium, and "all other nonpecuniary 
losses or claims. "54 To the extent that the right to any of these costly 
forms of noneconomic loss was questionable under Hawai'i law before 
the passage of this section, it is assuredly no longer questionable. So 
much for legislative tort reform. 
The question raised in this article, then, is how has the Hawaii 
Supreme Court during Chief Justice Lum's leadership responded to 
the concerns about excesses in the tort and insurance system that have 
4. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.3 (1986); see also Tobosa v. Owens, 69 Haw. 305, 
741 P.2d 1280 (1987); Keomaka v. Zakaib, 8 Haw. App. 518, 811 P.2d 478 (1991). 
49 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.9 (1986). 
50 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (1991). A wag might suggest that it is possible 
that ultimately the cost of litigating the meaning of this complex and confusing section, 
which purports to eliminate joint and several liability, may far exceed the damages at 
stake in such cases. 
51 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7 (1986). 
52 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
53 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.5 (1986). 
54 See id; see also Stephen Fearon, Hedonic Damages: A Separate Element in Tort Recoveries, 
56 DEF. COUNS. J. 436 (Oct. 1989). 
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been expressed in the wider community? Has the court continued on 
the boldly progressive course first set by the Richardson Court, or has 
it been more responsive to a perceived community policy calling for a 
reversal of the trend favoring plaintiffs? 
The answer-the thesis of this article-is that with regard to those 
areas of tort law of primary concern to those seeking "tort and 
insurance reform" in Ha~ai'i-to the State of Hawaii, to cities and 
counties, to liability and no-fault insurance companies, and to hotels 
and liquor establishments-the pro-plaintiff tort revolution has all but 
come to an end. While pro-recovery doctrines adopted during the 
Richardson years have not been overturned, 55 rights of victims and 
insureds have been kept within narrow bounds, and opportunities to 
expand recovery have generally been rejected. On the other hand, with 
regard to products liability, an area which ultimately has little impact 
on most Hawai' i enterprises since relatively few products capable of 
causing many serious injuries are manufactured in this State, the court 
has continued and indeed expanded upon the Richardson Court's 
liberal tendencies. 
Of course, these are generalizations. The court is' not a one-person 
court, but a court composed of five individuals who do not always 
share the same views and, indeed, whose composition may change 
significantly from case to case when individual justices recuse themselves 
or when judges retire and are replaced. Dissents occur, but they are 
rare. It may be assumed that unanimous opinions are at least occa-
sionally the product of compromises and tradeoffs; there will therefore 
be decisions, as we shall indicate, that do not seem to fit the general 
pattern. The sections which follow, however, will demonstrate the 
extent to which the thesis of this article-that the court has been 
engaging in a mild but significant kind of tort and insurance reform-
is proven. The broad areas to be examined are: insurance coverage; 
the scope of duty and liability in negligence cases; joint and several 
liability; damages; and products liability. 56 
\ 
55 This contrasts with California where newly elected conservative justices of the 
Supreme Court are overturning or sharply limiting earlier controversial pro-victims 
decisions. See, e.g., Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 58 (1988), 
overturning Royal Globe, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979) and Brown v. Superior Court, 751 
P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988), and limiting Sindell, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), een. denied, 449 
U.S. 912 (1980). 
56 Specific topics to be examined will include insurers' liability with regard to 
liability insurance, no fault insurance and uninsured and underinsured motorist 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. Insurance Coverage 
A strong indication of the extent of an appellate court's concern 
about claims of rising insurance costs and related problems is the extent 
to which the court expands or limits coverage in controversial areas of 
policy interpretation or leans in the direction of the insured or the 
insurer in cases of statutory interpretation. With some important 
exceptions, these are cases in which the applicable language of the 
policy or statute, or the legislative history, does not inexorably call for 
a particular result; the cases in which, as Cardozo noted, it is up to 
the court to flll the lacunae. With few exceptions, most occurring early 
in the period of Chief Justice Lum's tenure in that office, the court 
has decided these cases favorably to the insurer, and against the earlier 
trend of expanding the availability of coverage. 
1. Homeowner's Liability Insurance 
One technique some courts have used to expand the amount of 
liability insurance available to compensate victims of motor vehicle 
accidents is to find that defendant's homeowner's policy provides 
coverage. Unfortunately, the homeowner's policy typically and plainly 
excludes liability for bodily injury or property damage arising out of 
the ownership or use of an automobile. To get around this exclusion, 
these courts have had to hold, disingenuously, that if the insured's 
liability is based upon vicarious liability for the negligent driving of 
another, or upon negligent entrustment of an automobile by the insured 
to another, then the injuries caused by the accident do not arise out 
of the ownership or use of an automobile, but out of the relationship 
which creates vicarious liability or out of the insured's negligence in 
entrusting a vehicle to another. Although willing to apply rules of 
construction of insurance policies which tend generally to favor the 
insured, the Hawaii Supreme Court, in two unanimous opinions 
coverage; liability of liquor servers; governmental tort liability; damages; joint and 
several liability; instructions in negligence cases; and products liability. Medical 
malpractice has not been examined because the principal cases have been decided by 
the Intermediate Court of Appeals and have not been re-examined by the Hawaii 
Supreme Court. 
Not all cases in each area will be treated. 
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authored by Justice Nakamura, held itself bound to the exclusion in 
the homeowner's policy. 
Thus, in Fortune v. Wong, 57 the court held that parents vicariously 
liable for the negligent driving of a minor son under Hawaii Revised 
Statutes section 577-358 are not covered for that liability under the terms 
of their homeowner's policy.59 And, similarly, the court held, in 
Hawaiian Ins. & Guaranty Co., Ltd. v. Chief Clerk of the First Circuit 
Court,60 that negligent entrustment of an automobile does not provide 
separate homeowner's policy coverage for liability growing out of an 
accident involving that vehicle. 61 
In another decision which favored the insurer in a homeowner's 
policy, Hawaiian Ins. & Guaranty Co., Ltd. v. Blanco,62 the court held 
that the insurer had no duty to defend in a case where insured 
intentionally fired a gun at, or at least in a way to scare, a neighbor 
and injured him and was alleged also to have caused mental distress 
to the neighbor's wife, who was present at the time. 63 The clause in 
question excluded coverage for bodily injury "which is expected or 
intended by the insured. "64 The court held that there was no duty to 
defend even though, arguably, the frightening of the wife might have 
been negligently or recklessly caused rather than intentionally. In his 
opinion, Justice Padgett, with regard to both claims, found that their 
injuries were "expected" by the insured because a reasonable man in 
the insured's position would "anticipate" the injuries claimed to have 
been suffered. 65 With regard to the husband, the exclusion is probably 
warranted because firing to scare constitutes an assault, and if the 
" 68 Haw. 1, 702 P.2d 299 (1985) (Nakamura, J.). 
58 HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-3 (1984) provides in pertinent part: "The father and 
mother of unmarried minor children shall jointly and severally be liable in damages 
for tortious acts committed by their children, and shall be jointly and severally entitled 
to prosecute and defend all action in which the children or their individual property 
may be concerned." Id . 
•• 68 Haw. at 12, 702 P.2d at 307. 
60 68 Haw. 336, 713 P.2d 427 (1986) (Nakamura, J.). 
61 /d. at 342, 713 P.2d at 430-31. 
62 72 Haw. 9, 804 P.2d 876 (1990) (Padgett, J.). 
63 /d. at 19, 804 P.2d at 881. The Supreme Court has also held that the insurer 
under an automobile liability policy has no duty to defend a person in the driver's 
seat of a pick-up truck while plaintiff was being raped by another passenger in the 
rear section of the truck. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., Ltd. v. Brooks, 67 Haw. 285, 
686 P.2d 23 (1984) (Nakamura, J.) . 
.. 72 Haw. at 11, 804 P.2d at 878. 
MId. at 15, 804 P.2d at 881. 
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plaintiff is hit as a result, a battery. 66 It is not unusual for a liability 
policy to exclude intentional torts. But as to the wife's claim, the tort 
alleged under the facts may have been negligence; the question whether 
a reasonable person in the insured's position might anticipate (foresee) 
the wife's emotional distress is very close to the question we ask to 
determine whether a person may be held liable for the negligent infliction 
of emotional distressY The questions raised, therefore, but unfortu-
nately not expressly discussed, are whether the "expected or intended 
by the insured" exclusion encompasses ordinary negligence and, if so, 
whether an insurer in a policy designed to protect a homeowner from 
liability for negligence should be permitted to exclude such liability. 
Because of the doubt surrounding these questions, the court's holding 
that there was no duty to defend the wife's claim seems to contradict 
the broad expression of the insurer's duty to defend adopted by the 
court in 1982 in Standard Oil Co. of California v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guaranty 
Co., Ltd. 68 
2. General Liability Insurance 
It is understandable why general liability policies covering businesses 
might ordinarily be written to exclude liability coverage which would 
serve, in effect, as a guarantee of the quality of the insured's product 
or the effectiveness of an insured's services. We do not, for example, 
expect papaya growers' general liability policies to protect the growers 
from liability to purchasers if the papayas they sell turn out to be 
overripe and inedible. On the 'other hand, we do expect the provisions 
of such policies to cover injuries to persons and to things other than 
the product itself caused by defects in the products or negligence in 
performing the service. 
Early in the period under examination the Lum Court decided two 
cases in which general liability policy coverage of the quality of the 
insured's product or the effectiveness of the insured's work was in 
question. In the first, Sturla, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 69 the court, 
in an opinion by Justice Nakamura, held that the comprehensive 
general liability policy of a carpet manufacturer provided no coverage 
66 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 21 (1965). 
67 See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); also supra note 20 
and accompanying text. 
68 65 Haw. 521, 527, 654 P.2d 1345, 1349 (1982) (per curiam). 
6. 67 Haw. 203, 684 P.2d 960 (1984) (Nakamura, J.). 
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and that the insurer had no duty to defend a suit in which the gravamen 
of the claim was that carpeting sold by insured rapidly faded "after 
its delivery and installation in a condominium-hotel project on Kauai. "70 
Construing the policy's standard but arcane language, the court held, 
"[T]he terms of the policy could not have given rise to an objectively 
reasonable expectation of protection against claims that the product 
Sturla sold was 'not that for which the damaged person bargained." '71 
Rather, the court said, "[W]e believe the risks insured by the standard 
form policy are 'injury to people and damage to property caused by 
[a] faulty [product or] workmanship. "'72 
How far Sturla's restrictive view of the coverage of business risks 
would go was raised in the same year in Hurtig v. Terminix Wood 
Treating & Contracting Co., Ltd. 73 There, the question was whether an 
exterminator's comprehensive general liability policy covered termite 
damage to premises which followed insured's failure adequately to 
perform its contract to exterminate termites. 74 In one of the few cases 
in which the Lum Court held in favor of expanded insurance coverage, 
Chief Justice Lum and Justices Hayashi and Padgett held that injury 
to the premises was not excluded since the business risk exclusion 
recognized in Sturla only applies "to the insured's own work or work 
product. "75 In this case the exterminator's work and work product 
were "inspection and treatment" but the loss went beyond that "to 
the home itself. "76 
Justice Nakamura, joined by Justice Wakatsuki, dissented strongly. 
Their view was that the termite damage to the house was a business 
risk under the policy and that the insurance policy "could not have 
given rise to an objectively reasonable expectation of protection against 
a claim that the service rendered by Terminix was not that for which 
70 /d. at 204, 684 P.2d at 961. 
71 67 Haw. at 210, 684 P.2d at 963 (citing James A. Henderson, Insurance Protection 
for Products Liability and Completed Operations- What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. 
L. REV. 415, 441 (1971». The court in Sturla did not explain why the claim for 
consequential damages which the court found to be "of an intangible nature," 67 
Haw. at 206 n.3, 684 P.2d at 963 n.3, as distinguished from the claim for the 
economic loss of replacing the carpet, was not covered. 
72 /d. (quoting Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 791 (N.J. 1979)). 
" 67 Haw. 480, 692 P.2d 1153 (1984) (Hayashi, J.). 
74 /d. at 480, 692 P.2d at 1154. 
7S Id. at 482, 692 P.2d at 1154. 
76 /d. 
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the Hurtigs' bargained. "77 Their concern was that the majority's 
interpretation "would make the insurer a guarantor of adequate per-
formance of contractual obligations and transmute a liability policy 
into a performance bond. "78 
Justice Hayashi's majority opinion, however, is arguably the better 
one on two grounds. Technically, the homeowner was seeking conse-
quential damages to property damaged by the exterminator's failure 
properly to conduct the extermination. The business risk that would 
not be covered would be the economic cost of doing the inspection or 
exterminating job over again. But damage to other property, even if 
the purpose was to protect that property, would not, as the majority 
pointed out, constitute damage to the insured's "own work or work 
product."79 By way of analogy, it can hardly be doubted that a claim 
by a person who drowned as a result of a defective life preserver would 
be covered by the standard comprehensive general liability policy, even 
though the exclusive purpose of the preserver, like the exterminating 
service, was to protect against the very risk that occurred. Not every 
business risk is the kind of risk that is excluded by the language of 
the policy. 
The Hurtig decision, one of the few during the period under review 
in which the court actually expanded the availability of liability insur-
ance, seems sound on policy grounds, as well. Virtually every building 
in Hawai'i is at risk of termites. Those building owners who can afford 
termite treatment feel compelled to contract for it. If the job is badly 
performed, and not caught in time, the damage to the treated premises 
can be extensive. The only recourse of the owner in such cases is 
against the exterminator, and many exterminators are small businesses 
which may not be able to self-insure against such losses. The decision 
not to exclude coverage for such damage, therefore, constitutes an 
important protection to Hawai'i property owners, at least those who 
insist on using exterminators who are insured by a comprehensive 
general liability policy, and to the insured exterminators, as well. 80 
n /d. at 485, 692 P.2d at 1156 (Nakamura, Wakatsuki, JJ., dissenting). 
78 /d. 
79 /d. 
80 Cj K. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAw AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (1990). 
As a possible explanation of the justification for not applying the business risk exclusion 
to damage to property other than the economic loss involved in redoing the work, 
Professor Abraham suggested: 
[L]iability for bodily injury or damage to other property [caused by faulty work] 
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3. Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance 
The Hawaii Legislature has kept the amount of uninsured motorist 
(U.M.) insurance that must be offered to automobile ownergSl and the 
amount of mandatory automobile liability insurance82 at very low levels 
relative to the damages that may be expected in serious automobile 
accidents. In consequence, the availability of underinsured motorist 
(U.I.M.) insurance and the possibility of stacking U.M. and U.I.M. 
coverages have taken on great potential significance in cases of serious 
accidents where a defendant is uninsured or only insured for the 
minimum required coverage. 83 
While the language of the statute which required the offering of 
U. M. coverage84 did not clearly call for stacking, the absence of clear 
language to the contrary coupled undoubtedly with a progressive, if 
unspoken, policy of providing more adequate compensation for victims, 
led the Richardson Court to interpret the U.M. statute liberally to 
allow U.M. coverages to be stacked.85 
is sufficiently infrequent and the average cost of such liability sufficiently high 
that self-insuring against this kind of liability would be too risky for most small 
and medium-sized businesses. The business risk exclusions therefore do not 
pertain to this kind of liability. 
!d. at 504. Of course, this protection is contingent on insurers not altering the language 
of the policy for the specific purpose of excluding liability coverage in these cases. 
8. Cf HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-301(b)(3) (1990). Presumably the minimum 
amount of U.M. coverage that must be offered is $35,000, the minimum amount of 
liability coverage. However, § 431:lOC-301(b)(3) refers to HAW. REV. STAT. § 287-7 
for the amount which must be carried, and § 287-7, as currently written, does not 
mention any amount. 
82 HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-301(b)(1) (1990) ($35,000). 
83 Although persons injured in an automobile accident are usually entitled to no' 
fault benefits, the total amount available to compensate each person injured or killed 
is only $15,000, unless optional additional no-fault coverage is available. HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 431:10C-103(10)(B) (1990). The mandatory $15,000 amount has not changed 
since no-fault was adopted in 1972, although the cost-of-living since then has increased 
by two or three times. The $15,000 is clearly woefully inadequate to compensate 
seriously injured victims of automobile accidents. 
84 HAW. REV. STAT. § 431-448 (1985). 
85 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v Morgan, 59 Haw. 44, 575 P.2d 477 (1978) (Ogata, 
J.). Cf, Calibuso v. Pacific Ins. Co., Ltd., 62 Haw. 424, 616 P.2d 1357 (1980) 
(Nakamura, J.). 
Unfortunately, stacking of only U.M. coverage benefits only those who are wealthy 
enough to own more than one insured automobile or who are lucky enough to benefit 
from the policy or policies of such an insured. The better answer to the problem of 
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The Lum Court has not undone the Richardson era stacking cases. 
With regard to the availability of U.M. and U.I.M. insurance, it has, 
albeit with important exceptions, fairly liberally expanded coverage 
both to victims and to accidents that do not clearly fall within the class 
to be protected under the statute. In addition, the court has taken 
important steps to insure that insureds are not deemed to have rejected 
such coverage unless they do so knowledgeably. On the other hand, 
the court has' kept the total amount of U. M. and U. I. M. coverage 
available, ordinary stacking aside, within very parsimonious bounds 
indeed. 
Thus, although the court has refused to allow a motorcyclist injured 
by an uninsured motorist while riding his uninsured motorcycle to 
recover under the U.I.M. provisions of his father's auto policy,86 the 
court has extended U .M. coverage under the policy of the owner of 
an ambulance to an occupant, a paramedic, who left the vehicle at the 
scene of a motorcycle accident to place flares in the center of the road 
and was there struck by an uninsured motor vehicle,87 and has held 
that U .M. coverage was available to a motorist shot by a gun fired 
from another unidentified vehicle even though there was no indication 
that the gunshot had any other connection with the motor vehicles in 
which the victim and the shooter were riding.88 
inadequate insurance resources might be for the legislature (1) to raise the amounts 
of required liability coverage (in Japan, for example, the required amount is about 
$125,000 but most owners carry higher or even unlimited coverage); (2) to raise the 
required, or at least the optional, amounts of U.M. and U.I.M. coverage to levels 
which reflect the cost of compensation in serious accidents; (3) to raise the extremely 
low minimum amounts of no-fault coverage to reflect changes in the cost of living 
since the law was passed and also to offer optional additional no-fault up to amounts 
which reflect the current realities of economic costs of serious accidents, or (4) to 
adopt some parts or all of these three recommendations. Indexing would also serve to 
prevent the amounts from becoming inadequate over time, as they have in the past. 
B6 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ragil, 72 Haw. 205, 811 P.2d 473 (1991) 
(Wakatsuki, J.). This decision was consistent with the Hawaii Legislature's decision 
to deal separately with motorcycles-and their corresponding degree of risk of injury-
in order to keep the cost of injuries caused by motorcycles from causing excessive 
insurance costs, particularly to the motorcyclists themselves. /d. at 214-16, 811 P.2d 
at 476-77. 
87 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Olson, 69 Haw. 559, 751 P.2d 666 (1988) 
(Lum, C.J.). 
88 Ganiron v. Hawaii Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, 69 Haw. 432, 744 P.2d 1210 (1987) 
(Padgett, J.) (also allowing the victim to recover no-fault benefits). 
As the dissenting opinion by Justice Wakatsuki, joined by Justice Hayashi, con-
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Most significantly, in Mollena v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of Hawaii,89 
the court, in an opinion by Justice Wakatsuki, did Hawai'i automobile 
owners bewildered by the arcane complexity of auto insurance a 
significant service. The court held, first, that separate offers of U.I.M. 
coverage must be made prior to each policy renewal, in "every policy 
renewal notice."90 Second, the court "endorsed" a demanding four-
part test91 to be used to determine whether the offer of U .I.M. coverage 
is legally sufficient, and then held that the renewal notice sent by 
respondent Fireman's Fund was deficient on three of the four parts of 
the test. 92 In connection with the test, the court held that the burden 
of establishing that it has been satisfied is on the insurer, and cannot 
be met by telling the insured to contact an agent or broker of the 
insurer.93 Third, the court held that the current requirement that an 
applicant for automobile insurance must reject U.M. coverage in 
vincingly argues, for U.M. and no-fault coverage to exist, the automobile ought to 
"serve as more than merely the situs of the events .... " !d. at 437, 744 P.2d at 
1215. 
To add insult to injury, the court also held that the trial judge's award of only 
55% of attorney's fees to the claimant because the issue was a difficult one was not 
warranted under the no-fault statute; rather, claimant was entitled to 100%. !d. at 
436, 744 P.2d at 1215. Whether correctly decided or not, this case is likely to deter 
insurers from questioning coverage even in cases where the insurer's doubts are entirely 
reasonable. 
89 72 Haw. 314, 816 P.2d 968 (1991) (Wakatsuki, J.). 
90 !d. at 325, 816 P.2d at 973-74. 
91 !d. The test is set forth in Hastings v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 849 
(Minn. 1982): 
(1) if made other than face-to-face, the notification process must be commercially 
reasonable; (2) the limits of optional coverage must be specified and not merely 
offered in general terms; (3) the insurer must intelligibly advise the insured of 
the nature of the optional coverage; and (4) the insurer must apprise the insured 
that the optional coverage is available for a relatively modest increase in 
premium. 
/d. at 859. 
The court in its opinion did not indicate the source of these specific requirements 
in the Hawai'i statutes. The sections which describe and which require offering U.M. 
and U.I.M. do not, for example, require that the coverage be offered "for a relatively 
modest increase in premium." 72 Haw. at 325,816 P.2d at 974 (citing Hastings, 318 
N. W.2d at 859). In Hastings, the Minnesota Supreme Court found the source of these 
requirements in Jacobson v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 264 N. W. 2d 804 (Minn. 1978); 
Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1980); and Kuehenmeister 
v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 310 N.W.2d 86 (Minn. 1981). 
92 72 Haw. at 322-23, 816 P.2d at 972-73. 
93 !d. at 320, 816 P.2d at 971. 
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writing applies as well to U.LM. coverage.94 Finally and most impor-
tantly, the court held that the effect of the failure of the insurer to 
satisfy the four-part test is to provide the insureds with implied coverage 
"in the minimum amount [$35,000] required to be offered" for the 
kind of coverage being offered.95 
The question arises, however, as to just how much U.M. and U.LM. 
coverage is available in individual accidents, and it is here that the 
court's growing concern for the premium dollar becomes evident. Its 
decision that U.M. coverage provided by the City and County of 
Honolulu under a group policy for 1106 police-owned vehicles could 
not be stacked to provide $27 million of coverage to a policeman 
injured by an uninsured motorist while occupying his insured vehicle,96 
while unexceptional, nevertheless took specific note of the likely effect 
on premiums if such stacking were allowed. 97 Similarly, the court 
referred to "the legislative objective of optional [U .LM.] protection at 
the least possible cost" in Kang v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. CO,98 
a decision holding that a person injured by the negligence of the owner 
and driver of the vehicle in which he was a passenger who recovers 
from the liability coverage of the owner-driver's insurance may not 
also recover U. 1. M. coverage under the same policy. In Kang the court 
held a specific clause excluding the insured vehicle as an underinsured 
vehicle was not against public policy or in violation of the U.LM. 
statute, even though the plain meaning of the U.LM. statute would 
seem to require coverage.99 It is worth noting, however, that the court 
.. [d. at 324, 816 P.2d at 971. 
9' /d. at 326, 816 P.2d at 974. In Moorcroft v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, Ltd., 68 
Haw. 501, 720 P.2d 178 (1986) (Wakatsuki, J.), the court took an important step to 
protect the rights of those covered by U .M. insurance. It held that the insurer could 
not sit back and ignore the insured's demand for U.M. benefits, ignore and refuse to 
consent to the insured's bringing suit against the uninsured motorist, and then, after 
claimant gets a default judgment, seek to use the "consent to sue" clause to refuse 
to pay claimant the policy amount and also to insist on its right to arbitrate. [d. at 
504, 720 P.2d at 180. However, the court also held that although the insurer thus 
waived its right to consent to sue and its right to arbitrate the claim, it was only 
liable for the face amount of the U.M. coverage, and not the very much larger amount 
of the default judgment. /d. 
96 Lee v. Insurance Company of North America, 70 Haw. 120, 763 P.2d 567 
(1988) (Lum, C.J.). 
97 !d. at 124, 763 P.2d at 569. 
98 72 Haw. 251,815 P.2d 1020 (1991) (Moon, J.). 
99 The court, in an opinion by Justice Moon, while recognizing that "[uJnderinsured 
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evidently unanimously rejected, sub silentio, or perhaps did not even 
consider the opportunity to deal with the inadequacy of liability cov-
erage in the same manner the Hawaii Supreme Court acted in the 
original stacking cases: by constructing a rationale, based less on 
statutory construction than on public policy, to allow multiple cover-
age. IOO 
Another example of the court's restricting the amount of insurance 
available in an accident is Hara v. Island Ins. Co., Ltd. 101 There, 
plaintiffs, the widower and children of a person killed in an automobile 
accident, brought actions for wrongful death coupled with a survival 
action against defendants covered by an Allstate policy which provided 
"a maximum coverage of $25,000 per person for bodily injury or 
motorist coverage was designed to protect against loss resulting from bodily injury or 
death suffered by a'!)' person legally entitled to recover daT1ll1.ges from an owner or operator of an 
underinsured motor vehicle" (emphasis added), thus clearly describing the claimant in this 
case, nevertheless determined, based on the slim evidence that the no-fault law was 
intended to provide "adequate protection to persons injured in motor vehicle accidents 
at the least possible cost," that the plain language need not be followed. Instead, the 
court followed advice by Professor Wid iss to the effect that uninsured motorist insurance 
should not be transformed into liability insurance. !d. at 255-56, 815 P.2d at 1022 
(citing 2 WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE S 35.5 at 56-
57 (2d ed. 1985». But an owner of a motor vehicle might very well wish to provide 
extra protection to her passengers in the event she might negligently cause their injury, 
and why should they not get the benefit if the existing liability insurance is inadequate? 
"[A)dequate protection ... at least possible cost" is not the same as least possible 
cost regardless of adequacy. See Chun v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Haw. App. 290, 
687 P.2d 564 (1984) (Tanaka, J.) ("In the enactment of and amendments to the No-
Fault Law, the legislature was never guided solely by a policy of keeping no-fault 
insurance premiums low at all costs. "). 
It should also be noted that WIDISS, supra, mentions that in this situation "the fact 
that purchasers of underinsured motorist coverage have considerable latitude in regard 
to selecting the coverage limits is a matter of significant import." [d. S 35.5 at 56-
57. Evidently, he is referring to the possibility that an owner could buy minimal 
amounts of expensive liability coverage but protect his passengers against his own 
negligence by buying enormous amounts of cheap U.I.M. coverage. However, there 
is no indication in Kang and it does not appear to be the fact in Hawai'i that large 
amounts of optional underinsured motorist insurance, in excess of 535,000 per person, 
are available to most insurance purchasers. 
100 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 59 Haw. 44, 575 P.2d 477 (1978) (Ogata, 
J.). Cj Palisbo v. Hawaii Ins. and Guar. Co., 57 Haw. 10, 547 P.2d 1350 (1976) 
(Menor, J.); Walton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 55 Haw. 326, 518 P.2d 
1399 (1974) «Ogata, J.). 
101 70 Haw. 42, 759 P.2d 1374 (1988) (Padgett, J.). 
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death."102 Allstate tendered the $25,000 but plaintiffs proceeded to 
secure a default judgment in favor of the widower for $437,160, 
$180,712 to one child, $220,874 to another, and $86,278 to the widower 
as personal representative in the survival action. I03 Plaintiffs argued 
that, as in Palisbo v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guaranty Co., 104 if the amount of 
liability insurance available was insufficient to cover each injured person 
for the minimum amount of per person coverage required under Hawaii 
Revised Statutes section 287-7, in this case $10,000, then the defendant 
was underinsured and the victim's own U. M. coverage should provide 
the minimum amounts. 105 However, the court ruled, quite correctly in 
this case, that the claims of the plaintiffs were derivative of the decedent 
and, since she was the only one who suffered bodily injury or death, 
and since the amount available from Allstate clearly exceeded the 
amount that must have been available under the statute to compensate 
her injuries, the defendant was neither uninsured nor underinsured. 106 
Perhaps the most restrictive decision in the interpretation of U.M. 
and U .I.M. coverage of the Lum Court is National Union Fire Ins. Co. 
v. Ferreira. 107 There the court held that U.M. and U.I.M. coverage 
were mutually exclusive: If defendant has no insurance then only U .M . 
. coverage is available, but if defendant has insurance but it is inadequate 
102 /d. at 43, 759 P.2d at 1374-75. 
103 [d. 
104 57 Haw. 10, 547 P.2d 1350 (1976). 
105 /d. at 44, 759 P.2d at 1375. 
106 [d. at 17, 759 P.2d at 1379. Interestingly, Justice Padgett's opinion suggests a 
possibility for expanding the liability available in an accident. He expressly leaves 
open the question whether, under the liability requirements of the no-fault statute-
then "$25,000 for all damages arising out of accidental harm sustained by anyone 
person as a result of anyone accident applicable to each person sustaining accidental 
harm .... "-the Allstate policy, which would evidently only pay $25,000 in this 
case, was in compliance with the statute. /d. It is possible that "accidental harm" 
under the statute might be interpreted to include emotional distress suffered by a 
relative of the victim and sought by way of an "independent tort" of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress or even by way of a wrongful death action. If so, there 
should be a separate fund of $35,000 which would become available under the current 
no-fault law to cover liability to each person suffering such harm. But if. Doi v. 
Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 6 Haw. App. 456, 727 P.2d 884 (1986) (Heen, J.) 
(action for loss of consortium was derivative and hence defendant whose liability 
insurance did not provide a separate fund to cover such liability was not underinsured), 
and National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Villanueva, 716 F. Supp. 450 (D. Haw. 1989) 
(holding that a pure emotional distress claim is not independently compensable 
accidental harm under no-fault law). 
107 71 Haw. 341, 790 P.2d 910 (1990) (Moon, J.). 
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to cover plaintiff's damage, then only underinsured coverage is avail-
able. loB The most unfortunate feature of this holding is that a person 
who has purchased both $35,000 each of U.M. and U.I.M. coverage 
to protect herself and who suffers damage of $100,000 from an unin-
sured motorist, can only recover $35,000 ofU.M. coverage and nothing 
from her U.I.M. coverage, leaving $75,000 of her losses uncovered 
notwithstanding she paid premiums for both and her likely expectation 
that both would be available in a situation like this. Unlike Kang, in 
which the court disregarded the literal meaning of the underinsured 
motorist statute, in Ferreira the court seemed to fasten woodenly on the 
language of the same statute and to ignore its spirit and intention. I09 
The definition of an "uninsured motor vehicle" in the statute read: 
[A] motor vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use 
of which the sum of the limits oj liability of all bodily iT/Jury liability insurance 
coverage applicable at the time of the loss to which coverage afforded by such policy 
or policies applies is less than the liability for damages imposed by law. 110 
The court then held that under this language a prerequisite "is the 
existence of 'bodily injury liability insurance coverage .... "'111 Thus, 
"[ w ]here a tortfeasor has no bodily injury liability insurance coverage 
... he is not underinsured .... "112 With all due respect, however, 
the court's reading of the literal meaning is not inexorable, for if the 
"sum of the limits of liability" is zero, then zero is certainly "less 
than the liability for damages imposed by law." And arguably, since 
U.M. coverage in such a situation stands in for defendant's liability 
insurance, it is not stretching things too far to suggest that the defendant 
is "insured" and therefore "underinsured" if the U.M. coverage does 
not cover the entire damages. A better solution surely would have been 
to hold that U.M. covers the first $35,000 (or other amount of U.M. 
coverage) of loss and the U.I.M. coverage covers the last $35,000 (or 
other amount of U. I. M. coverage) of loss so that in the situation 
described above plaintiff would recover a total of $70,000 of this 
$100,000 IOSS.113 
lOB !d. at 346, 790 P.2d at 912. 
109 71 Haw. at 345, 790 P.2d at 912-13. 
110 !d. at 344-45, 790 P.2d at 913 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 431-448 (1985». 
III 71 Haw. at 345, 790 P.2d at 913. 
112 [d. 
113 If the insured had only U.I.M. coverage, arguably it would not be unfair to say 
that coverage does not substitute for U.M. coverage, i.e., it does not cover the first 
$35,000 of loss. 
1992/ TORTS AND INSURANCE 79 
What seems to be revealed, however, by the Ferreira decision, and 
particularly by the arguably inconsistent way in which the court treated 
the same statute in Kang and Ferreira, is the court's newly restrictive 
attitude toward the ability of an accident victim to draw upon different 
forms of coverage to achieve full compensation for a single accident. 
The opinions in both cases were written by Justice Moon. Dare we 
suggest that with the addition ~f Justice Moon to the court the emphasis 
has shifted from more adequately compensating the accident victim to 
protecting the insurance buyer's pocketbook? 
4. Automobile Liabil£ty Insurancell4 
The decisions deciding questions of motor vehicle liability insurance 
seem consistent with the emerging trend toward reducing the insurer's 
exposure and start with an important case early in the period which 
expanded coverage and an equally important case at the end which 
contracted it. Thus, in 1983, in Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 115 
the court interpreted the Franklins' policy to provide coverage to protect 
them against the liability of their minor daughter who had been held 
liable for an automobile accident while involved in a common enterprise 
with two friends. Evidently the three minors had operated a car owned 
by the parents of one of the other minors without the parent's express 
or implied permission. 1I6 Under Hawaii Revised Statutes section 577-3,117 
parents are strictly liable for the torts of their minor children. Under 
Hawai'i's no-fault law, however, liability coverage seems only to be 
extended to owners of automobiles involved in accidents and to drivers 
who are driving with the express or implied permission of the owner. liS 
The difference between these two statutes potentially leaves open a 
serious exposure to personal liability without insurance protection for 
parents whose minor children negligently harm others, as in this case, 
while driving someone else's car without the express or implied per-
mission of the owner of that car. Here, however, the parents argued 
, .. For an important case dealing with the abolition of tort liability in automobile 
accident cases and the proof necessary to meet the conditions necessary for bringing 
a suit, see discussion of Parker v. Nakaoka, infra note 182 and accompanying text. 
II> 66 Haw. 384, 662 P.2d 1117 (1983) (per curiam). 
116 !d. at 385, 662 P.2d at 1118. 
117 Set supra note 58 (quoting pertinent part). 
118 Set HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:lOC-301(a)(2)(1987). 
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that the language of their own policy covered them in this instance. 119 
The language in question provided: 
Persons insured: The following are insured under Part I: 
(b) with respect to a non-owned automobile, 
(1) the named insured, 
(2) any relative, but only with respect to a 
private passenger automobile or trailer, provided his actual operation or (if 
he is not operating) the other actual use thereoJ is with the permission, or reasonably 
believed to be with the permission, oj the owner and is within the scope oj such 
permission . ... 120 
Courts had gone both ways on the question whether the proviso in 
part (2) also modified paragraph (1), so as to make the coverage of 
the parent's (the named insured's) vicarious liability conditional on 
their child's using the other parent's car with the permission of the 
other parent. 121 The Hawaii Supreme Court, however, in a per curiam 
opinion found the policy provisions ambiguous and, on that basis, held 
that they should be interpreted in favor of the insured. Thus, the 
parent's coverage was not conditioned on their daughter's having had 
permission to use the car involved in the accident. 122 
Other pro-claimant decisions relating to liability involved the limi-
tations periods in the no-fault law. 123 They include Crawford v. Craw-
ford,124 in which the court held that the general tolling provisions relating 
to children apply to automobile accident cases for wrongful death 
brought by children to recover for the death of their mother notwith-
standing the two-year limitations period in the no-fault law, 125 and Zator 
v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 126 which held that the no-fault statute of 
119 66 Haw. at 387, 662 P.2d at 1119 . 
• 20 /d. at 386, 662 P.2d at 1119 (emphasis the court's). 
12. 66 Haw. at 386-87, 662 P.2d at 1119. 
121 /d. The benefits of this holding to parents in Hawai'i would be lost if insurers 
modified their policies to make the proviso applicable to named insureds, as well as 
to relatives. Because the legislature has saddled parents with vicarious liability without 
any fault, however, public policy would seem to require that they be protected from 
liability in cases like this. Insurers, therefore, should either be prevented from excluding 
such protection from homeowner's or automobile liability policies or should be required 
to offer such protection optionally, as in the case of U.M. and U.I.M. coverage . 
• 23 HAW. REV. STAT. S 431:10C-301 (1987). 
'2' 69 Haw. 410, 745 P.2d 285 (1987) (Hayashi, J.) . 
• 2> /d. at 417, 745 P.2d at 289 . 
• 26 69 Haw. 594, 752 P.2d 1073 (1988) (Lum, C.J.). 
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limitation may be tolled pending appointment of guardian for a claim-
ant who is incompetent when the cause of action accrued. 127 
By way of contrast, the court in 1991, in Hawaiian Ins. & Guaranty 
Co., Ltd. v. Financial Security Ins. CO.128 had to decide whether the 
relatively rich ($500,000) liability policy of the retail seller of an 
automobile or the minimum liability coverage ($25,000) of the buyer's 
policy covered the car when the buyers were sued for wrongful death 
as a result of an accident which occurred after the car was sold and 
possession transferred to them. The buyers took possession of the car 
on December 28, 1983, and the accident occurred on January 16, 
1984. 129 The seller, however, had not yet processed and sent documents 
reflecting the transfer of ownership to the Department of Motor Vehicles 
and the Department did not issue new certificates of ownership and 
registration until February 3, 1984.13° 
By the plain language of two statutes, Hawaii Revised Statutes section 
286-52(e)131 of the motor vehicle registration law and section 294-
2(13)132 of the Hawai'i No-Fault Law, the seller under these facts would 
not only be deemed the owner of the motor vehicle but, under the 
registration law, the owner "for any purpose." Further, the no-fault 
law required every "owner" of a motor vehicle to maintain a no-fault 
policy on the vehicle. 133 
Nevertheless, the court, speaking through Justice Moon, disregarded 
the statutes' plain meaning and found that the seller's policy was not 
applicable. 134 With regard to its interpretation of the motor vehicle 
registration law, the court relied on Pacific Ins. Co. v. Oregon Auto Ins. 
Co. ,135 a case in which a private seller had sold the car to a buyer and 
forwarded the documents to the Treasurer prior to the accident but 
the title did not reach the private buyer until a day or two later. 
Under those circumstances, the court found that a literal application 
127 [d. at 598, 752 P.2d at 1075. 
128 72 Haw. 80, 807 P.2d 1256 (1991) (Moon, J.). 
129 [d. at 82-83, 807 P.2d at 1257-58. 
130 [d. at 83, 807 P.2d at 1258. 
III HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 286 (1929). 
112 [d. ch. 294 (1973). The operative language provided: "Whenever transfer of tide 
to a motor vehicle occurs, the seller shall be considered the owner until delivery of 
the executed title to the buyer, from which time the buyer holding the equitable title 
shall be considered the owner." [d. § 294-2(13). 
'" [d. § 294-8(a)(1) (1978). 
Il< 72 Haw. at 89, 807 P.2d at 1262-63. 
13> 55 Haw. 208, 490 P.2d 899 (1971). 
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of the statute would work an absurd and unjust result by imposing 
liability on the seller. Arguably, the facts in this case were distinguish-
able, since the seller had not forwarded the documents at the time of 
the accident and the seller may actually have been withholding the title 
documents until the buyer fulfLlled a commitment to pay a promised 
installment on the purchase price. 136 Most importantly, the mandatory 
provisions of the Hawai'i No-Fault Law were not involved in Pacific. 
With regard to the provisions of the no-fault law, the court drew a 
distinction between the motor vehicle statute and the motor vehicle 
insurance policy which seems difficult to support. Noting that because 
the statutory definition of owner "was expressly limited to that term 
'[a]s used in this chapter [294],''' the court then proceeded to conclude 
that "it is clear that the legislature did not intend that the definition 
dictate the meaning of the term as used in automobile insurance 
policies," and that "the term 'owner' as defined in Hawaii Revised 
Statutes section 294-2(13) is not determinative of ownership in the 
context of insurance coverage disputes." 137 
The problem, of course, is that the entire purpose of chapter 294, 
dealing with motor vehicle insurance,138 is to dictate the terms and 
conditions of required motor vehicle insurance. To apply different 
criteria of ownership to coverage disputes, on the one hand, and to 
questions as to who is required to purchase insurance and secure a no-
fault card, on the other, is to invite confusion in enforcement of and 
to undermine the motivation of sellers to comply with mandatory 
statutory requirements to maintain a no-fault insurance policy on a 
vehicle until the executed title has been delivered to the buyer. 
Further, as Justice Padgett noted in his dissenting opinion,. the 
language of the policy of the seller, who is designated owner under the 
statute, clearly contemplated coverage when the automobile was being 
driven by someone with the permission of the "named insured. "139 As 
Justice Padgett correctly pointed out, the question was not one of 
"stacking," "but a question of whether or not the [seller's] policy 
covered the [buyers] at the time of the accident."I40 Further, as he 
136 This is true even though the trial judge found that the evidence was insufficient 
to establish that the insurer was holding the documents until monies owed under the 
contract were paid. See Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 72 Haw. at 86 n.7, 807 P.2d at 
1259 n.7. 
137 [d. at 90, 807 P.2d at 1261. 
138 Now HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:lOC (1987). 
139 72 Haw. at 95, 807 P.2d at 1263 (Padgett, J., dissenting). 
140 /d. 
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also stated, there is "nothing in the law that prohibits two parties, 
each having interests in a vehicle from taking out separate liability 
policies thereon. "141 
Once again, therefore, the legislative objective of "reducing motor 
vehicle insurance costs," explicitly set forth in the majority opinion, 142 
seems to take precedence not only over the explicit language of the 
statutes and the seller's insurance policy, but over the legislative 
objective of insuring adequate coverage143 as well. Where, by virtue of 
good fortune perhaps, adequate coverage-a seller's $500,000 liability 
. policy-was made available by law, the sympathies of the courtl44 and 
only $25,000 per person to the injured third parties under the buyer's 
liability policy seem not to be sufficient substitutes. 
5. No-Fault Insurance (Personal Injury Protection) 
The provisions of Hawai'i's No-Fault Law, as originally conceived 
and as adopted in 1973, were well designed to keep many small injury 
claims out of the courts and to provide adequate non-fault compensation 
by way of a tradeoff for the former right to sue. 145 In the interim, two 
distressing things have occurred. First, the mandatory amount of no-
fault personal injury protection coverage required, $15,000, has not 
been increased and has become woefully inadequate to provide com-
pensation for victims of many minor accidents. Second, the threshold 
which has to be crossed before suits can be brought has been signifi-
cantly eroded,l46 allowing too many of the small claims to proceed to 
'il /d. Should the court have held the seller's insurer liable in this case, it is likely 
that insurers of retail automobile sellers would seek arrangements with their insureds 
to ensure that title documents are promptly transmitted to the director of finance for 
issuance and delivery of a new title to the buyer unless seller has a good reason for 
not doing so. Conceivably, the seller would be required by the insurer to retain 
possession of the vehicle until the new title was available. If this caused too much 
trouble for sellers, a change in the law should have been sought from the legislature. 
,.2 72 Haw. at 92-93, 807 P.2d at 1261. 
"3 ld. 
'44 /d. at 93, 807 P.2d at 1262. 
,., See Wiegand v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 68 Haw. 117, 121, 706 P.2d 16, 19 (1985) 
(Wakatsuki, J.). 
'46 See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431:10C-306(b)(2) (threshold), 431:10C-308 (annual 
revision of medical rehabilitative limit by commissioner). The Medical Rehabilitative 
limit, evidently the easiest threshold for most automobile accident victims to cross, is 
currently $8300.00. 
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suit. 147 The upshot is that insurers are having to pay the full amount 
for questionably necessary "soft" therapy, which enables a victim to 
exceed the $8300.00 medical-rehabilitative limit and thus bring suit, 
and then, in addition, to pay for the costs of the suit and any damages 
awarded. On the other hand, accident victims who suffer actual eco-
nomic losses and medical expenses but who elect not to play the system 
by running up bills for unnecessary treatment, may not be compensated 
adequately for their actual economic losses. 148 
Appropriate reform, therefore, would undertake to deal with both of 
these problems: the inadequacy of the no-fault amount and the inef-
fectiveness of the threshold. The question for discussion here, therefore, 
is whether and to what extent the Supreme Court during the era of 
Chief Justice Lum has improved or exacerbated these problems. 149 
a. Inadequacy of benefits 
The court's tendency during Chief Justice Lum's reign has been 
generally to respond favorably to requests to expand the amount or 
'41 Arguably, any reform undertaken by the legislature should treat both problems. 
It would be most unfortunate if, in the interests of reducing premiums, the legislature 
were to impose greater barriers to suit without correspondingly increasing to adequate 
levels the amount of compensation available to victims who could not sue. At least 
one proposal, however, would do just that. See, e.g., LICENSE TO STEAL (Coalition for 
Auto. Ins. Reform, Honolulu, Haw.) (pamphlet circulated during the Hawai'i Leg-
islative Session of 1991; copy on file with the authors) . 
• 48 For example, they can only recover earnings losses up to $900 per month, when 
in fact their actual earnings losses may be far in excess of that amount. See HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 431:10C-I03(19)(A)(iii) (1987) . 
•• 9 Late in the era of the Richardson Court, two decisions, Joshua v. MTL, Inc., 
65 Haw. 623, 656 P.2d 736 (1982), and McAulton v. Goldstrin, 66 Haw. 14, 656 
P.2d 96 (1982), with the majority opinions written by Justice Padgett over the strong 
dissents of Justices Nakamura and Richardson, almost put an end to the no-fault law 
by holding that the provisions in the law which abolished tort liability unless certain 
conditions were met denied persons not eligible for no-fault benefits equal protection 
of the law. 65 Haw. at 632, 656 P.2d at 742; 66 Haw. at 15, 656 P.2d at 100. Thus, 
those persons could sue directly without meeting the threshold conditions. The Hawaii 
Legislature, in response, quickly stepped in, chiding the court for "having eroded one 
of the most important elements of the no-fault system, the mandatory insurance 
coverage of all who choose to exercise the privilege of driving" and amending the law 
to correct the defects perceived by the court. Cf Washington v. Fireman's Fund Ins. 
Cos., 68 Haw. 192, 708 P.2d 129 (1985) (Hayashi, J.) (upholding the constitutionality 
of the no-fault law after passage of Act 245 (1983». Although the two dissenters have 
left the court and the members of the original majority remain, no decisions during 
the era of the Lum Court have set aside such essential features of the no-fault law. 
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availability of no-fault personal injury protection (P.I.P.) benefits when 
asked by accident victims to do so. Often the expansion goes beyond 
the plain language of the statute. 
Perhaps the most blatant example is In re Maldonado,150 where the 
issue was how much by way of P.I.P. benefits, for lost earnings, should 
be paid to an injured bus driver who was receiving workers' compen-
sation benefits. The worker's salary had been $1,534 per month. The 
accident caused him to be totally disabled. Workers' compensation 
paid him $931.66 per month. His actual monthly wage loss, therefore, 
was $602.34 per month. 151 
The no-fault statute provided, in pertinent part: 
Payment from which insurer . . . . 
(b) All no-fault benefits shall be paid secondarily and net of any benefits 
a person is entitled to receive because of the accidental harm from . . . 
workers' compensation laws .... 152 
When the no-fault insurer of the bus company denied Maldonado's 
claim for the difference between what he received from workers' 
compensation and his former salary, he appealed to the insurance 
division. The hearing officer ruled in his favor but the Insurance 
Commissioner reversed. On appeal both the circuit court and the 
Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the Insurance Commissioner. 153 
On appeal to the Supreme Court the court reversed, holding that the 
quoted section "deals not with the claimant's right to benefits ... but 
only with priority, as to payments, among insurers." 154 To borrow his 
own language,155 Justice Padgett, the author of the opinion, seems to 
have "emasculate[d] the plain language of' Hawaii Revised Statutes 
section 294-5, not to mention having ignored the legislative history, 
which made it rather clear that workers' compensation benefits were 
to be subtracted from the amount of P.I.P. benefits that would oth-
erwise be available. The dissenters, Justices Nakamura and then-Circuit 
Judge Moon, convincingly demonstrated the correctness of the opposite 
result. 156 They also noted that the decision created "an anomaly that 
.>0 67 Haw. 347, 687 P.2d 1 (1984) (Padgett, j.). 
15' [d. 
152 HAW. REV. STAT. § 294-5 (1973). 
'" 67 Haw. at 347, 687 P.2d at 4. 
154 !d. at 350, 687 P.2d at 4. 
ISS Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Financial Security Ins. Co., 72 Haw. 80, 95, 
807 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1991) (Padgett, j., dissenting) . 
• >6 67 Haw. at 351, 687 P.2d at 5. 
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could not have been within the legislature's contemplation-a loss of 
$1,534 in gross earnings will now be replaced by $1,534 in tax free 
benefits. "157 
Other cases which tended to expand the amount of P.I.P. benefits 
include these: 
Early in his tenure, Chief Justice Lum wrote the opinion in Mizoguchi 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 158 in which the estate of the 
no-fault insured, who had died while driving his automobile, sought 
the full optional amount of P .I.P. coverage, $50,000. 159 The no-fault 
insurer, Allstate, argued that the survivor's recovery should be restricted 
to $15,000, the maximum amount set forth in the no-fault law in the 
event of death. The court, in a well-reasoned decision, held "that work 
loss benefits would be payable in cases of death in addition to any 
survivors' loss benefits and that eligible beneficiaries would be entitled 
to no-fault benefits up to the increased aggregate limit of any additional 
coverage. ' , 160 
In Ganiron v. Hawaii Ins. Guaranty Ass 'n, 161 the court held that a 
victim of a shooting from one automobile into another was entitled to 
no-fault benefits. 162 The court's expansive decision in Ganiron raises the 
interesting question whether the court's generous reasoning would have 
led to the payment of P.I.P. benefits to the victim in Hawaiian Ins. & 
Guaranty Co., Ltd. v. Brooks,163 who was raped by another passenger in 
the back of a pickup truck. 
In Barcena v. The Hawaiian Ins. & Guaranty Co., Ltd.,164 Justice 
Nakamura, in his decision for the court, deliberately rejected a narrow 
interpretation of statutory language which seemed to allow the insurer 
to deny the insured's claim for the expenses of physical therapy. 165 The 
no-fault law, in describing no-fault benefits, barred payment of expenses 
157 [d. at 354, 807 P.2d at 6. Subsequently, the legislature amended the section in 
question, partially adopting the majority's holding that workers' compensation benefits 
paid for lost earnings should not be deducted from the earnings losses to be paid by 
no fault, but limiting the total payment to no more than 80% of the person's monthly 
earnings. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-305(2)(1988). 
158 66 Haw. 373, 663 P.2d 107 (1983) (Lum, C.J.). 
159 !d. at 374, 663 P.2d at 110 . 
• 60 [d. at 378, 663 P.2d at 113 . 
• 61 69 Haw. 432, 744 P.2d 1210 (1987) (Padgett, J.). 
162 69 Haw. at 435, 744 P.2d at 1212 . 
• 63 67 Haw. 285, 686 P.2d 23 (1984) (Nakamura, J.). 
'64 67 Haw. 97, 678 P.2d 1082 (1984) (Nakamura, J.). 
165 [d. at 104, 678 P.2.d at 1087. 
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of physical therapy, as well as other expenses, "for any person receiving 
public assistance benefits" if the assured was issued a no-fault policy 
at no cost to her as a recipient of public assistance. 166 In this case, 
insured had been receiving public assistance benefits when she received 
a free policy but had evidently become ineligible for public assistance 
at the time she incurred the physical therapy expenses. 167 In allowing 
recovery, the court read the language restrictively, holding that '" no-
fault benefits' are withhold able only while a person is a recipient of 
public aid. "168 
In a particularly generous decision, a unanimous court, in Lorenzo 
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 169 held that a no-fault insured who 
became permanently disabled in an automobile accident could continue 
to receive work-loss benefits under his no-fault policy even after suf-
fering a serious heart attack not caused by the automobile accident, 
which independently would have rendered him unable to work. 170 
Although it is extremely doubtful that the legislature intended to 
continue payment of no-fault work loss benefits in this situation and 
although the relevant language of the no-fault law provided little or no 
support for continuing the payments, the court nevertheless found for. 
claimant, expressing its approval of the reasoning in the dissent to a 
Michigan case that had been decided in favor of the insurer. 171 
While the foregoing cases indicate a large degree of liberality on the 
part of the court in deciding whether no fault coverage is available 
and, if so, in coming down on the generous side, there are other cases 
which indicate that the court has not "given away the whole store." 
In First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, Ltd. v. Jackson,172 for example, the court 
refused to allow an automobile accident victim and the tortfeasor to 
bind the insurer, which had paid no-fault benefits to the victim, by a 
provision in the release specifying that the settlement was for general 
damages only and did not duplicate payments for any no-fault benefits 
paid to the claimant. 173 The objective of the settlement agreement had 
166 HAW. REV. STAT. § 294-2(10) (1973). 
167 67 Haw. at 104, 678 P.2d at 1087. 
168 /d. at 103, 678 P.2d at 1086-87. 
169 69 Haw. 104, 736 P.2d 51 (1987). 
170 /d. at 110, 736 P.2d at 52. 
171 MacDonald v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 350 N.W.2d 233, 238-39 (Mich. 
1984) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
172 67 Haw. 165, 681 P.2d 569 (1984) (Padgett, J.). 
'" ld. at 167, 681 P.2d at 570. 
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been to bar the insurer from trying to recover fifty percent of the no-
fault benefits it had already paid,174 as it had the right to do under 
Hawaii Revised Statutes section 294-7. 175 In affirming a decision of the 
Intermediate Court of Appeals,t76 the court, in an opinion by Justice 
Padgett, disagreed with the Intermediate Court of Appeals' holding 
that the burden of proving that there was no duplication was on the 
insured.177 Instead, the court held that "the insurer must prove factually 
that the settlement duplicated, in whole or in part, the no-fault benefits 
already paid." 178 In view of the difficulty the insurer is often likely to 
encounter in proving that there was a duplication, the holding that the 
release is not conclusive may turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory for the 
insurers. 
A case which much more clearly kept no-fault coverage within limits 
was Rana v. Bishop Ins. oj Hawaii, Inc., 179 where the court adopted and 
affirmed a decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals which had 
held that an insured who had a single insurance policy which covered 
several vehicles could not stack the basic no-fault (personal injury 
protection) coverage on each vehicle. 180 On this issue the no-fault statute 
seems to speak clearly, 181 and the court followed the clear statutory 
language. 
b. Maintaining the threshold 
With regard to the problem of maintammg the integrity of the 
threshold to bringing a lawsuit, the most important case of the period 
was arguably Parker v. Nakaoka. 182 Plaintiff, injured in an automobile 
accident, was found by a jury to have suffered $1174.10 of special 
damages and $66,500 as general damages. 183 The amount of spe~ial 
174 /d. at 167, 681 P.2d at 570-71. 
175 HAW. REV. STAT. § 294-7 (1973) (now HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-307 (1987». 
176 5 Haw. App. 98, 678 P.2d 1095 (1984). 
177 67 Haw. at 167, 681 P.2d at 570-71. 
178 /d. at 167, 681 P.2d at 571. 
179 68 Haw. 269, 709 P.2d 612 (1985) (Wakatsuki, J.). 
'110 That is, he could not multiply the amount of personal injury protection coverage 
or basic no-fault-usually $15,000 unless additional optional coverage is purchased-
by the number of cars insured under the policy in order to increase the amount 
available to each covered person. 
'8' See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 294-2(10), 294-3(c) (now § 431: 10C-303 (1987». 
'82 68 Haw. 557, 722 P.2d 1028 (1986) (Wakatsuki, J.). 
'83 /d. at 558, 722 P.2d at 1029. 
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damages was too low to reach the medical-rehabilitative limit, then set 
at $1500, which was one of the ways plaintiff could have overcome the 
abolition of tort liability. 
It is important to note that, without regard to the specific facts of 
plaintiff Nakaoka's case, this situation-small economic losses coupled 
with the potential for substantial non-economic losses for pain and 
suffering, emotional distress, and the like-is illustrative of the very 
class of costly cases the legislature wanted to remove from the courts 
unless evidence of more serious injury was present. 184 The way in 
which the court handled this case is, therefore, indicative of the court's 
seriousness in keeping a tight rein on the cases which slip through the 
"tort abolition" net. 18S 
In Parker, the critical question was whether plaintiff suffered "a 
significant permanent loss of use of a part of her body. "186 if she had, 
then her tort action was proper; if not, then her tort action would be 
dismissed. Two errors were claimed by the defendant: (1) that the 
judge, rather than the jury, should have determined the critical ques-
tion, or, (2) in the alternative, that defendant's requested special 
verdict, putting to the jury the question whether plaintiff's injury 
satisfied the threshold seriousness requirement ,187 should have been 
'84 See id. at 559, 722 P.2d at 1029. These were the class of cases in which the 
legislature believed that "relatively minor losses were overcompensated." [d. Also, see 
id. for the list of "notable deficiencies in the insurance system" the legislature was 
seeking to correct when it adopted the no-fault law. As to the trade-off between 
guaranteed no-fault benefits and the right to sue in order "to reap a monetary 
windfall," see id. at 560, 722 P.2d at 1030. 
'8' The court seemed to misdescribe the operation of the no-fault law when it said, 
in discussing how the law operated, "The traditional tort remedy was left intact for 
economic losses exceeding those amounts assured of payment under the law, but for 
non-economic losses which the law assures no definite payment the tort remedy was 
not left wholly intact." !d. at 560, 722 P.2d at 1028 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 294-
6 (now § 431:10C-306 (1987»). Under the no-fault law, if plaintiff cannot sue, she is 
limited to the no-fault benefits provided in the act, up to $15,000. This $15,000 
includes no non-economic losses. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff crosses one of the 
thresholds for tort liability, she is entitled to sue for all of her economic and non-
economic losses, but must return to the no-fault insurer 50% of the no-fault payments 
duplicated by the tort recovery. HAW. REV. STAT. § 294-6 (now § 431-10C-306 (1988». 
'86 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 294-6 (1973) (now § 431:10C-306 (1987». 
'87 68 Haw. at 588, 722 P.2d at 1029. The instruction read: "In the accident of 
February IS, 1978, did Plaintiff SUSAN PARKER sustain injury which constituted 
a significant permanent loss of use of a part or function of the body? Answer: Yes-
No." !d. at 558 n.3, 722 P.2d at 1029 n.3. 
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given. 188 Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintained (1) that the failure 
of the plaintiff to satisfy the threshold requirement should not only be 
a jury question but an affirmative defense, to be pleaded and proved 
by the defendant, and (2) that the bare-bones special verdict should 
not be given since the appellant failed to proffer an explanatory 
instruction to the jury on. the threshold requirement. 189 
The court essentially "split the baby," holding first that whether 
the plaintiff has satisfied the threshold requirement is a question for 
the jury, not the judge, 190 yet then holding that the burden of pleading 
and proving that the threshold has been satisfied is on the plaintiff, 
and that the defendant in this case was entitled to have the special 
verdict submitted to the jury without proffering an explanatory instruc-
tion. 191 
Unfortunately, Justice Wakatsuki, in his opinion for the court, did 
not see fit to provide the specific facts of the Parker case, so the reader 
is left at sea as to why there was a significant issue as to whether the 
claimed injury satisfied the particular threshold requirement at issue. 
If, as a result of trial judges' interpretation of Parker, the practice of 
sending most contested cases of painful and possibly long-lasting injury 
to the jury should develop, then the purpose of the no-fault law could 
be thwarted. If the court is serious in its effort to enforce the policy 
behind the no-fault law, as Parker suggests it is, then it should not be 
unwilling to develop some clear interpretations which might allow most 
non-serious cases which ought, on fair reading of the legislative intent, 
to fallon the wrong side of the threshold to be dismissed on motion 
for summary judgment. 
B. Negligence 
The question is whether, and if so, to what extent the Lum Court 
has indulged the tendency to allow ordinary negligence principles to 
expand to their logical limits, as discussed at the beginning of this 
article. The conclusion, to be developed in the discussion below, is 
that, with the exception of product liability, the era of expansion of 
tort liability has come to an end. 
188 68 Haw. at 558, 722 P.2d at 1029. 
189 /d. at 562-62, 722 P.2d at 1032. 
190 /d. at 562, 722 P.2d at 1031. Unless, of course, the judge determines that 
reasonable persons could not agree. Id. 
191 Id. 
1992 / TORTS AND INSURANCE 91 
1. The Firefighter's Rule192 
In 1969, in Pickard v. City and County oj Honolulu 193 the Hawaii 
Supreme Court, following the lead of the California Supreme Court, 194 
dispensed with the familiar categories of licensee and invitee which had 
traditionally governed the duties of an occupier of land to those who 
came upon the land. In its place the court imposed a duty on the 
occupier "to exercise reasonable care for the safety of all persons 
anticipated to be on the premises."195 In 1965, in Bulatao v. Kauai 
Motors, Ltd. 196 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Rhoda Lewis, 
citing with approval New Jersey's path-breaking decision in Meistrich 
v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 197 rejected the applicability of the doctrine 
of secondary assumption of risk in cases in which the doctrine merely 
paralleled the doctrine of contributory negligence. 198 The court also 
held that assumption of risk has no place when a person knowingly 
encountering a known risk is found to have acted reasonably in doing 
SO.199 
In view of these cases one might have predicted that when the court 
came to decide whether to allow a firefighter to recover damages for 
injuries suffered in line of duty as a result of a land occupier's 
negligence in causing the fire and the injuries, it would have answered 
in the affirmative. After all, absent the doctrines of primary and 
secondary assumptions of risk, eliminated by Pickard and Bulatao, there 
is precious little reason left under the traditional law of torts for denying 
recovery to the firefighter in such cases. This is particularly true when 
Hawai'i statutes impose a duty on landowners to keep their buildings 
"reasonably safe from loss of life or injury to persons or property by 
fire."2°O 
192 See Thomas v. Pang, 72 Haw. 191, 203, 811 P.2d 821 (1991) ("The name of 
the rule adopted in this case is not the Fireman's Rule. Its name is the Firefighter's 
Rule, formerly known as the Fireman's Rule." (Burns, J., concurring». 
193 51 Haw. 134,452 P.2d 445 (1969) (Richardson, C.J.); see also Gibo v. City and 
County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 299, 459 P.2d 198 (1969) (Abe, J.). 
194 Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
195 51 Haw. at 135, 452 P.2d at 446. 
196 49 Haw. 1, 406 P.2d 887 (1965). 
197 155 A.2d 90 (N.J. 1959). 
198 49 Haw. at 15, 406 P.2d at 895. 
199 Id. at 14, 406 P.2d at 894. 
200 HAW. REV. STAT. § 132-8 (1917). 
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Nevertheless, in Thomas v. Pang,201 the court adopted the firefighter's 
rule. Rather than relying on the discredited traditional defenses, how-
ever, the court asserted that it explicitly relied "on considerations of 
public policy.' '202 What these considerations seem to boil down to is 
that firefighters are to be denied the recovery available to most other 
public employees when they suffer injury in the line of duty as a result 
of an occupier's negligence because: (1) they are needed for the 
protection of society;203 (2) their presence at the locus of a fire arises 
out of a "duty owed to the public as a whole;"204 (3) their very purpose 
is to confront danger;205 (4) "the timing of their entry cannot be 
predicted;"206 (5) while they are "performing their duties a landowner 
or occupier is without authority to control their action; "207 and (6) 
"[d]anger is inherent in a firefighter's work and the firefighter is 
trained and paid to encounter hazardous situations unlike the majority 
of public employees. "208 
While each of these reasons is true, individually they do not seem 
to justify the denial of recovery and they do not fare any better 
collectively. In order to be found liable for negligence, after all, a land 
owner would have to unreasonably fail to foresee and guard against 
an unreasonable risk of harm to those who might come on the premises. 
"The risk to be perceived," said Cardozo, "defines the duty to be 
obeyed"209 and "danger invites rescue. "210 A landowner who negli-
gently creates a risk of fire also negligently creates a risk of harm to 
the firefighter who comes to put out the fire. It is hard to see why the 
nature of the firefighter's profession or the other factors mentioned by 
the court should result in a denial of recovery. 
What might arguably justify denial of recovery from a policy point 
of view, however, is a genuine fear that every time a firefighter is hurt 
in the course of duty at a fire, a lawsuit will be brought against the 
occupier of the premises or others who might be charged with negli-
201 72 Haw. 191, 811 P.2d 821 (1991) (Wakatsuki, J.). 
202 /d. at 196, 811 P.2d at 824. 
203 [d. 
204 /d. 




209 Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928). 
210 Wagner v. International Railway Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921). 
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gence. 211 The fear of a multitude of suits, however, was pretty well 
discredited by the Richardson Court as a reason for denying a just 
claim. 212 If this is the "real" basis for the decision, therefore, the 
decision represents an about-face for the court, demonstrating, like 
others already discussed, a heightened concern for the premium payer 
and the insurer213 and significantly reduced concern for deterrence and 
for the adequacy of compensation. 214 
2. Negligent Serving of Liquor 
In 1980, in Ono v. Applegate,215 the Richardson Court held that a 
victim of an accident caused by another's intoxication could recover 
damages from the bar that negligently served liquor to the other while 
the other was intoxicated. 216 In his opinion for the court, Justice Ogata 
expressly repudiated the traditional common law rationales which dis-
ingenuously reasoned that it was the voluntary consumption of the 
alcohol-and not its sale or service-that was the proximate cause of 
the ensuing accident, and that it was not reasonably foreseeable to the 
liquor seller or server that the sale or service of the alcoholic beverage 
would cause the subsequent accident or injury. 
The court found the seller's duty to arise from the Hawai'i liquor 
law which, although it does not expressly provide a civil remedy in 
damages, prohibits the sale of liquor by a licensee to a person "under 
the influence of liquor. "217 
211 72 Haw. at 202, 811 P.2d at 827 (Padgett, J., dissenting). "Let us make no 
mistake about what this case really involves. It involves the liability insurance policies 
of those in control of the premises where the fire occurred." /d. 
212 See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (Richardson, 
C.J.). 
213 Although the firefighter's rule has recently come under criticism, it is evidently 
followed by the vast majority of states. See Annot., Liability of Owner or Occupant of 
Premises to Fireman Coming Thereon in Discharge of His Duty, 11 A.L.R.4th 597 (1979). 
But see Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210 (Or. 1984). 
21t 72 Haw. at 197, 811 P.2d at 827. 
m 62 Haw. 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980) (Ogata, J.). For a good analysis of Ono, see 
Note, Ono v. Applegate: Common Law Dram Shop Liability, 3 U. HAW. L. REV. 149 
(1981). 
216 The court drew heavily on the analysis of the California Supreme Court in 
Vesely v. Sager, 486 P.2d 151 (Cal. 1917), even though Vesely had been specifically 
abrogated by the California legislature well before the Hawaii Supreme Court consid-
ered Ono. 
217 HAW. REV. STAT. § 281-78(a)(2)(B) (1976). The statute provides, in pertinent 
part: "(a) At no time under any circumstances shall any liquor: .... (2) Be sold or 
furnished by any licensee to: (A) Any Minor. (B) Any person at the time under the 
influence of liquor. ... " [d. 
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The logic of the decision in Ono would have suggested that since an 
adjacent subsection of the same statute prohibited a licensee from 
selling liquor to a minor, minors who are served liquor while intoxicated 
might also recover for their injuries caused by the intoxication. The 
opinion in Ono, however, expressly left open the question "whether a 
non-commercial supplier of liquor may be held liable for injuries caused 
by the intoxicated.' '218 As to that question and the question whether 
the intoxicated patron, not a minor, who gets into an accident and 
suffers injury after leaving the premises where the liquor was served 
can recover against the server, the court strongly suggested that a 
common law duty, not grounded in the liquor control statute, might 
exist: "The first prime requisite to deintoxicate one who has, because 
of alcohol, lost control over his reflexes, judgment and sense of re-
sponsibility to others, is to stop pouring alcohol into him. This is a 
duty which everyone owes to society and to law entirely apart from any statute. "219 
If the court were to find such a duty to run to the drinker, as well 
as the third person, then presumably the appropriate way to deal with 
the drinker's own negligence would be to consider his behavior under 
Hawai'i's comparative negligence statute. 220 
In a series of decisions since Ono, however, the Lum Court has 
refused to extend liability for serving of liquor beyond the facts of Ono 
itself, notwithstanding the clear promise of Justice Ogata's opinion. 
Thus, In Bertlemann v. Taas Associates221 the court held that "in the 
absence of harm to an innocent third party, merely serving liquor to 
an already intoxicated customer and allowing said customer to leave 
the premises, of itself, does not constitute actionable negligence.' '222 
The court did note, however, that "a bar or tavern owes a duty to 
avoid affirmative acts which increase the peril to an intoxicated cus-
218 62 Haw. at 136 n.5, 612 P.2d at 538 n.5. 
219 /d. (emphasis added). The common law, non-statutory duty, might arise from 
reasoning similar to that contained in Brett, M.R. 's famous dictum in Heaven v. 
Pender: 
Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in a position with regard to 
another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize 
that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to 
those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property 
of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger. 
11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883). 
220 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1985). 
221 69 Haw. 95, 735 P.2d 932 (1987) (Hayashi, J.). 
222 /d. at 101, 735 P.2d at 934. 
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tomer. "223 In Feliciano v. Waikiki Deep WaterIH the court held that the 
duty to avoid affirmative acts did not include "aggressive sales of 
drinks" to a nineteen-year-old adult who claimed lack of sophistication 
about drinking. 225 Plaintiff had claimed that although he did not recall 
ever asking for a drink, alcoholic drinks began arrIvmg 
"automatically"226 and, being intimidated by the aggressiveness of the 
waitresses, he paid for and drank them. 227 · During the drive home 
Feliciano's truck left the road and crashed, rendering him a quacl"ri-
plegic.228 In Johnston v. KFC National Management CO.229 the court ex-
plicitly held that "a non-commercial supplier of alcoholic beverages-
the social host-does not have a duty to protect third persons from 
risks of injury caused by an inebriated person to whom the social host 
served alcoholic beverages. "230 Finally, in Winters v. Silver Fox Bar231 
the court extended the holding of Bertlemann-that the person unlawfully 
served liquor cannot recover for his own injuries-to an eighteen-year-
old minor who became drunk and subsequently sustained a fatal injury 
as a result of his intoxication. 232 The decision is broad enough to deny 
recovery to minors under the age of eighteen. 233 However, the court's 
223 Id. Such an act, for example, might be removing the customer to a place where, 
because of his intoxication, he will be subjected to increased peril of bodily harm. Cj 
Parvi v. City of Kingston, 362 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that city had duty 
to plaintiff hit by a car who had been transported by police, while intoxicated, to spot 
outside the city limits near a busy thoroughfare). 
". 69 Haw. 605, 752 P.2d 1076 (1988) (Lum, C.].). 
225 Id. at 606, 752 P.2d at 1077. Feliciano grew up in Waianae and claimed that 
before the incident he had never driven to Honolulu and had never been to Waikiki; 
that he grew up in a sheltered environment due to an accident in which he was run 
over by a truck as a teenager, preventing him from attending school for a considerable 
period of time; and that he had tasted beer on prior occasions but was not an 
experienced drinker. !d. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. Feliciano claimed to have consumed at least four drinks in a two-and-a-half 
hour period and to have spent approximately $175.00. Id. 
228 !d. at 606, 752 P.2d at 1077-78. 
229 71 Haw. 229, 788 P.2d 159 (1990) (Wakatsuki, ].). 
230 Id. at 230, 788 P.2d at 159-60. 
231 71 Haw. 524, 797 P.2d 51 (1990) (Moon, ].). 
232 71 Haw. 524, 536, 797 P.2d at 56-57. The court also held that the rights of the 
minor's survivors under the wrongful death act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1985), 
were derivative. Since the minor was barred, so were his survivors. Id. 
m The court cited Miller v. City of Portland, 604 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Or. 1980), in 
which the Oregon Supreme Court denied recovery to a minor even though a statute, 
like Hawai'i's, prohibited the sale of liquor to persons under twenty-one. The Oregon 
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lengthy discussion of the legislative purpose in raising the drinking age 
from eighteen to twenty-one-simply to satisfy federal requirements for 
continued receipt of highway funds234-and its description of a minor 
as connoting "one who lacks maturity and requires supervision and 
protection for his/her well-being and safety, "235 suggests that the court 
might eventually allow recovery in the case of such a "true" minor.236 
The necessary effect of these post-Ono cases, however, is to put an 
end to the logical extension of the negligence principles set free in Ono. 
And the reasons for doing so are made unequivocally clear by Justice 
Wakatsuki in Johnston and by Justice Moon in Winters. In refusing to 
allow social host liability in Johnston, the court views the problem 
"[fJrom an economic perspective [where] there needs to be considera-
tion of the effect social host liability would have on homeowners' and 
renters' insurance rates, and the economic impact on those not wealthy 
or foresighted enough to obtain such insurance.' '237 In refusing to 
extend the right to recover to a minor unlawfully served liquor at a 
bar, the court in Winters rooted around the legislative history of the 
Hawai'i "tort reform" legislation, which as has been noted above does 
not amount to much,238 and proceeded to adopt the legislative intent 
there expressed as the policy to be followed in these cases: 
[W]e note that the 1986 Regular and Special Session of the legislature 
focused its efforts on tort refonn due to the then purported liability 
insurance crisis and sought to reduce and stabilize automobile and 
commercial liability insurance rates. Therefore, it would be totally 
court had noted that there was another statute, as there is in Hawai'i, which prohibits 
minors from purchasing liquor and that "[i)t would be inconsistent with apparent 
legislative policy to reward the violator with a cause of action based upon the conduct 
which the legislature has chosen to prohibit and penalize." 71 Haw. at 529-30, 797 
P.2d at 53 (quoting Miller, 604 P.2d at 1263). 
A contrary argument, however, is that notwithstanding the prohibition and penalty 
imposed on minors for purchasing alcoholic beverages, the statute prohibiting licensees 
from selling liquor to "true" minors should be interpreted as protecting them, as a 
class, from their own immaturity and lack of judgment. Cj W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 18 at 123 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter 
"PROSSER"). 
23t 71 Haw. at 532, 797 P.2d at 55. 
m /d. at 531, 797 P.2d at 54. 
236 The court indicated that the question whether infants under 18 should be dealt 
with differently from infants over 18 should be decided by the legislature. /d. at 535, 
797 P.2d at 56. 
237 71 Haw. 229, 237, 788 P.2d. 159, 163-64 (1990). 
238 See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text. 
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inconsistent with the legislative policy of 1986 to conclude that it intended 
to expand the liability of commercial liquor suppliers which in turn 
would undoubtedly increase their liability insurance premiums. 239 
97 
Such creative use of legislative policy may be appropriate as a 
makeweight where the court's decision may effect "changes in social 
relations in a society where consumption of alcohol is a pervasive and 
deeply rooted part of our social life, "240 as is probably the case with 
holding social hosts responsible for serving liquor to their guests. But 
it is considerably less clear why such legislative expression of policy 
should be given effect with regard to a dram shop's liability to minors 
whom it is prohibited by statute from serving where the Hawaii 
Supreme Court's direction in effectuating the statutory purpose behind 
the liquor licensing law has already been demonstrated in a widely 
discussed case, ana v. Applegate, and the legislature has not expressed 
its dissatisfaction either by overruling ana or by adopting legislation 
limiting its expansion. Indeed, the legislature seems to be demonstrating 
far greater concern in recent years for the problems of drunk driving241 
than it has for the problems it has dealt with under the heading of 
tort reform. 242 
In any event, it is suggested that there were, and still are, options 
available to the court with regard to the serving of alcoholic beverages, 
whether by a licensee or a social host, that will enhance deterrence as 
well as compensation for deserving victims without necessarily bringing 
on a flood of litigation or producing a new crisis in the availability 
and cost of commercial and homeowners' insurance. For example, the 
court could require that the plaintiff prove that the defendant, or 
defendant's employee, had actual knowledge of facts regarding the drink-
239 71 Haw. at 534-35, 797 P.2d at 56 (footnotes omitted). The court also noted 
that the legislature has been adopting stricter laws and heavier penalties in order to 
cut down on "the devastating cause of loss of human life and limb on our highways," 
/d. at 535, 797 P.2d at 56. However, it decided that whether the law should be 
expanded to further deal with these problems, in the face of the economic issues it 
identified in connection with tort reform, should better be left to the legislative branch: 
"It is within the legislature's province to weigh and balance the far reaching social, 
economic and legal consequences of modifying the common law as Appellant urges." 
/d. 
240 71 Haw at 237, 788 P. 2d at 159 (quoting Garren v. Cummings & McReady, 
Inc., 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (S.C. App. 1986) (quoting Miller v. Moran, 421 N.E.2d 
1046, 1049 (Ill. App. 1981))). 
2<1 See Johnston, 71 Haw. at 236, 788 P.2d at 163. 
2.2 See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
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er's consumption of alcohol or the drinker's other conduct, or both, 
which would make it obvious, to a reasonably prudent person in the 
defendant's circumstances, that the drinker was intoxicated. 243 Perhaps 
such a test, which eliminates the much more liberal "should have 
known" criteria of ordinary negligence,244 if coupled with a higher 
burden of proof, such as "clear and convincing evidence"245 would 
strike an appropriate balance between the competing policies involved 
in these cases. If so, then there is no compelling reason to refuse to 
so extend the negligence principle in order to help to further reduce 
the incidence of alcohol-based accidents and to compensate its victims. 246 
3. Actions Against Governmental Entities 
In the State Tort Liability Act, the State waived its immunity from 
tort liability and provided that the State "shall be liable in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances .... ' '247 Notwithstanding this clear mandate for Ha-
wai'i's courts to treat the state the same as they would a private 
defendant, even the Richardson Court tended to interpret the common 
law in a manner favoring the State against a tort claimant seeking to 
recover from the State's deep pocket. Thus, by way of a fairly blatant 
example, the court in 1973, in lkene v. Maruo,248 held that the State 
had no duty to design or correct a dangerous curve in a highway in 
order to make it safe for persons in speeding cars,249 even though 
speeding drivers are as foreseeable as rain in Hawai'i, the State knew 
or should have known that the curve in question was dangerous, and 
the plaintiff was the passenger and not the speeding driver. 
243 In a similar vein, some states have limited the liability of social hosts or others 
to "obviously intoxicated" or "visibly intoxicated" minors. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & 
PROF. CODE § 25602(b)-(c) (West 1985); id. § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1988) ("obviously 
intoxicated); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.950-30.960 (1988) ("visibly intoxicated"). 
2« Under Ono, for example, the liberal "should have known" criteria may impose 
on a liquor seller a burdensome duty which it would be impracticable to enforce in a 
busy bar. 
m See, e.g., Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 780 P.2d 566 (1979) 
(Lum, C.J.) (adopting "clear and convincing" standard as a requirement for proof 
of punitive damages); see infra note 318 and accompanying text. 
2<6 Cj, Note, 102 HARV. L. REV. 549 (1988) (calling for judicial adoption of social 
host liability). 
247 HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-2 (1957). 
248 54 Haw. 548, 511 P.2d 1087 (1973) (Levinson, J.). 
249 !d. at 551, 511 P.2d at 1089. 
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This same tendency seems to continue to be at work under the 
current court. Thus, by way of the most serious example, the court in 
Wolsk v. State250 held that the State had no duty to warn or provide 
protection against the criminal conduct of third persons to visitors 
camping in a state park. 251 While camping in MacKenzie State Park 
two visitors were brutally beaten and one of them was killed by 
unidentified persons.252 The court considered the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts which recognizes, in section 315(b), a duty to control the conduct 
of third persons "so as to prevent [them] from causing physical harm 
to another" where "a special relation exists between the actor and the 
other which gives to the other a right to protection. "253 Section 314(A)(3) 
states, as one of the situations creating such a relationship, that "a 
possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar 
duty to members of the public who enter in response to his invita-
tion. "254 Nevertheless, the court held: "[T]he Restatement principles 
are not applicable to the facts of this case since no special relationship 
exists.' '255 In so holding the court inexplicably failed to explain ade-
quately why section 314(A)(3), which was specially italicized in the 
opinion, was inapplicable. 256 The cases cited by the court dealt for the 
most part with the absence of a relationship between the criminal actor 
and the public entity where there was dearly no special relationship 
between the public entity and the plaintiff. 257 In the one cited case in 
which the relationship between the plaintiff and the occupier, a hotel, 
was in question, the Intermediate Court of Appeals had found that 
there was no duty to protect a non-guest of the hotel. 258 However, by 
way of contrast to Wolsk, the court in the following year, in Knodle v. 
Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 259 found a duty based upon the special 
250 68 Haw. 299, 711 P.2d 1300, 59 A.L.R. 4th 1229 (1986) (Hayashi, ].). 
251 /d. at 303, 711 P.2d at 1303. 
252 /d. at 300, 711 P.2d at 1301. 
253 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(b) (1965), cited in 68 Haw. at 301-02, 
711 P.2d at 1302. 
25+ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(A)(3) (1965), cited in 68 Haw. at 301-
02, 711 P.2d at 1302. 
255 68 Haw. at 302, 711 P.2d at 1302. 
256 /d. 
257 Id. 
25' King v. IJikai Properties, 2 Haw. App. 359, 632 P.2d 657 (1981) (Hayashi, 
C.J.) (noting that HAW. REV. STAT. § 314(a)(2) recognizes a special relationship 
between an innkeeper and his/her guests). 
259 69 Haw. 376, 742 P.2d 377 (1987) (Nakamura, ].). The opinion in Knodle is an 
important and well-written exegesis on the law of negligence and its elements. 
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relationship of innkeeper and guest, as set forth in Restatement section 
314(A), to protect guests from unreasonable risks of criminal conduct. 260 
It is difficult to understand, except on the ground of preferential 
treatment for the State, why the court followed the Restatement and 
recognized a special relationship in Knodle but not in Wolsk. 261 
Other examples of the court's granting the State greater protection 
than is granted to private defendants are provided by two decisions 
holding, first, that the tolling statute for minors applies to automobile 
negligence actions brought pursuant to the no-fault law, 262 which ex-
pressly bars suits based on motor vehicle accidents brought more than 
two years after the accident or after the last no-fault payment,263 and 
second, that it does not apply to such actions brought under Hawai'i's 
State Tort Liability Act,264 which bars suits in which the action is not 
brought within two years after the claim accrues. 265 While the court 
found a colorable reason applicable to the suit against the State which 
would justify different treatment from that given to the action under 
260 /d. at 392, 742 P.2d at 388. 
261 The most difficult issue in cases such as these may be the question of "cause in 
fact" or "substantial factor." It is by no means clear either in Wolsk or in Knodle that 
exercising reasonable care would have prevented the tragic consequences. Assuming 
the question is allowed to get to the jury, there is naught for the jury to do but 
speculate as to whether the taking of reasonable precautions by defendant would have 
made any difference. 
Where the State is a defendant, as in Wolsk, the question whether the exercise of 
the duty falls within the "discretionary function" exception to State tort liability may 
provide another opportunity for the court to protect the State from liability. Bec.ause 
the court in Wolsk found no legal duty to plaintiffs, it determined that it did not have 
to respond to this question. In the future, however, this grounds of exception to state 
tort liability is likely to loom much larger in view of the extraordinarily expansive 
view of what constitutes a discretionary function adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. Gaubert, __ U.S. __ , 111 S.Ct. 1267 (1991). In Gaubert 
the Court rejected the planning level/operational level distinction, which had been the 
principal guideline for Hawai'i and other courts in the past, and held that even an 
operational level activity could be a discretionary function if "it involved the exercise 
of discretion in furtherance of public policy goals." /d. at __ , 111 S.Ct. at 1279. 
The Court noted: "If the routine or frequent nature of a decision were sufficient to 
remove an otherwise discretionary act from the scope of the exception, then countless 
policy-based decisions by regulators exercising day-to-day supervisory authority would 
be actionable." /d. 
262 Crawford v. Crawford, 69 Haw. 410, 745 P.2d 285 (1987) (Hayashi, J.). 
263 HAW. REV. STAT. § 294-36(b) (1985). 
264 Whittington v. State, 72 Haw. 77, 806 P.2d 957 (1991) (Padgett, J.). 
265 HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-4 (1985). 
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the no-fault law-that the tolling statute only applies to actions there 
specified266 and the action under the State Tort Liability Act is not 
specified267-such a conclusion does not seem inexorable: the court 
could have found that the nature of the action, one for personal injury 
arising out of a motor vehicle accident, was specified in Hawaii Revised 
Statutes section 657-7, which is the statute of limitations applicable to 
"actions for the recovery of compensation for damages or injury to 
persons or property.' '268 
It is not difficult to understand why the court might wish to protect 
the State's fisc against a multitude of actions. On the other hand, the 
State Tort Liability Act does call rather specifically for treating the 
State the same as a "private individual. "269 
4. Jury Instructions-Emergency Rule, Unreasonably Dangerous, and Joint 
and Several Liability 
In two cases, one as recent as 1989, the Lum Court has upheld 
claims of error in negligence cases when the trial court has given 
instructions to the jury which are technically correct, but which the 
court feels tend excessively to favor the defendant. In the first case, 
Dicenzo v. Izawa,27o the court, in an opinion by Justice Nakamura, held 
that it was error to give a correct instruction on the emergency rule271 
separately and apart from the general negligence instruction. The court· 
said "The doctrine of sudden emergency cannot be regarded as some-
thing apart from and unrelated to the fundamental rule that everyone 
266 HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-13 (1984). 
267 Whittington, 72 Haw. at 78, 806 P.2d at 957-58. 
268 HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-7 (1907). 
269 HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-2 (1957). 
270 68 Haw. 528, 723 P.2d 171 (1986) (Nakamura, J.). 
271 The instruction read, in pertinent part: 
An emergency situation is a sudden or unexpected combination of circumstances 
which calls for immediate action. Such a situation leaves the actor with no time 
for thought and requires a speedy decision based largely on impulse. 
Thus, if you find that if defendant ... faced an emergency situation on April 
12, 1982 which was not of her own making, you must find that she was not 
negligent in her conduct if you also find that her actions were those of a 
reasonably prudent person in a similar emergency. Whether or not such emer-
gency situation existed on April 12, 1982 is a matter of fact for you to decide 
based upon all of the evidence of the case. 
/d. at 540-41, 723 P.2d at 171. 
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is under a duty to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances to 
avoid injury to others. "272 The court was concerned that placing the 
instruction on the emergency rule apart from the negligence instruction 
might create the erroneous impression that the emergency rule provided 
a standard of care different from the ordinary standard of care in a 
negligence case and that this might also confuse the jury. 273 Because 
of problems of confusion associated with the emergency doctrine,274 the 
court's opinion, though pro-plaintiff, was not exceptional. 
The case of Corbett v. Ass 'n of Apartment Owners of Wailua Bayview 
Apartments.,275 however, is another story. In Corbett, plaintiff claimed to 
have fallen as a result of a five-inch difference between the height of 
the sidewalk and the adjacent lawn. 276 The trial court gave defendant's 
proposed instructions, which stated that in order to recover, plaintiff 
must prove that the condition was "unreasonably dangerous.' '277 Evi-
dently, the unreasonably dangerous requirement was repeated five times 
in the instructions. 278 
The court, speaking through Justice Padgett, held the instructions 
incorrect: 
The focus of the test for negligence should be, and, if? the case of jury 
instructions, must be, on the unreasonableness of the risk of harm, not 
on the degree of dangerousness of the condition. 
A jury might, and probably would, regard the four- to five-inch 
difference in height between the sidewalk and the adjoining lawn as not 
"unreasonably dangerous" but it might find that, in the circumstances 
of the case, it posed an unreasonable risk of harm. 279 
With all due respect, the distinction between the charge glven and 
the court's preferred language seems to be a distinction without a 
difference. "Danger" and "risk" are synonyms, as are "dangerous" 
272 /d. at 541, 723 P.2d at 179. 
213 /d. at 543, 723 P.2d at 181. The court also stated: "[W]e think the wiser course 
of action would be to withhold sudden emergency instructions." /d. at 544, 723 P. 2d 
at 181. However, the court did indicate that it would be permissible for counsel to 
make the sudden emergency argument in addressing the jury. /d. 
27. See PROSSER, supra note 233, § 33 at 196-97. 
275 70 Haw. 415, 772 P.2d 693 (1989) (Padgett, J.). 
276/d. at 415, 772 P.2d at 694. 
277 /d. at 416, 772 P.2d at 694. 
278 Id. 
27. /d. at 417-18, 772 P.2d at 695. 
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and "risky" .280 It seems clear that a condition which constitutes an 
"unreasonable risk of harm," the preferred language, is "unreasonably 
dangerous," the prohibited language. 
While it is true that some courts, including the Hawaii Supreme 
Court, have eliminated the requirement that a defective product be 
"unreasonably dangerous" in order to recover under strict product 
liability, the reason that requirement has been eliminated is that it 
smacks of negligence. 281 The Corbett case, however, was a negligence 
case and the unreasonably dangerous language in the charge seems 
entirely appropriate. 
From the point of view of tort reform, surely one of the most 
significant cases handed down by the Lum Court was Kaeo v. Davis. 282 
In Kaeo, the court held that where a party so requests, the trial court 
should inform the jury of the possible effect of a verdict in which it 
(the jury) apportions negligence among two or more joint tortfeasors. 
The action was a suit by a passenger of an automobile for serious 
injuries suffered when the vehicle collided with a utility pole. 283 Under 
the facts found by the jury in its special verdict, the driver of the car 
was found by the jury to be 99% negligent, while the City and County 
of Honolulu was found to be 1 % negligent. 284 Under the rule of joint 
and several liability, of course, the effect of such a verdict would be 
to make the two defendants each liable for 100 % of the verdict. 
Although the defendant paying a higher percentage of the damages 
than its percentage of fault would normally have a right to contribution 
against the other, the reality in a case such as this, where the jury 
found damages of $725,000,285 would be that the much-less-negligent 
defendant, in this case the City and County, will end up paying the 
lion's share of the verdict; more often than not the driver or owner of 
the vehicle will only have the minimum mandatory amount of liability 
insurance coverage-$35,000 for each injured person-and minimal 
personal assets, as well. 
Why is telling the jury the effect of their verdict so significant? 
Because the subject of joint and several liability is one with which most 
280 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 209, 732 (1961); see also, BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 393, 1328 (6th ed. 1990). 
281 See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972). 
282 68 Haw. 447, 719 P.2d 387 (1986) (Nakamura, J.). 
28' !d. at 449, 719 P.2d at 389. 
284 !d. at 451, 719 P.2d at 390. 
285 !d. 
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jurors are not familiar. If the jury is asked to assign a percentage of 
fault to each defendant guilty of some causal fault, it is likely to infer, 
quite logically, that each defendant will only be liable for that percentage 
of the verdict. In fact, however, each such defendant will become 
jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for the entire verdict. Should 
that be known to the jury, should the institutional defendant be guilty 
of the smaller amount of fault (in this case only 1 %), and should the 
jurors, or some of them, be concerned about the high cost of taxes or 
utility rates, the likelihood is probably excellent that the jury will prefer 
to find the institutional defendant not guilty rather than subject it to 
what the jury might believe is an excessive and disproportionate amount 
of the damages. At the least, the jury will be severely tempted to 
distort its findings in order to remove the burden of liability from the 
institutional defendant. 
Thus, the effect of informing the jury of the effect of joint and 
several liability will be to tempt the jury to distort the facts they find 
in order to achieve a result that they believe might benefit them as 
taxpayers or rate-payers. Possibly, but not necessarily, they may also 
believe that the result they are seeking by distorting the facts is more 
just. If they do so believe, then they will, in effect, be rewriting the 
law to suit their own view of what the law should be. 
The rule of joint and several liability, however, is essentially a just 
rule: a party who negligently subjects another to an unreasonable risk 
of harm should be liable for the entire damages if the operation of 
that risk is the proximate cause of the damages, even though the 
negligence of other parties concurred to produce those damages. 286 
Arguably, therefore, the jurors' substitution of their own judgment, 
possibly for self-serving reasons, should be discouraged. This is partic-
ularly true where, as here, the legislature has considered the matter 
and enacted detailed legislation which, in effect, retains the rule of 
joint and several liability in most cases. 287 
286 One of the reasons the deep pocket defendant may end up being saddled with 
an excessive amount of the liability costs, when its negligence is compared with that 
of other defendants as in this case, is that the "shallow pocket" defendant is 
inadequately insured. Insurance inadequacy is a serious problem not only because of 
unfairness to the wealthier defendant, but especially because it adversely effects seriously 
injured plaintiffs in cases where there is no deep pocket defendant. This problem 
should be resolved by a substantial increase in the amount of minimally required 
liability insurance, as is the case in other nations, such as Japan and Canada. 
287 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (1986). 
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In any event, the likely effect of informing the jury of the effect of 
their findings is to achieve a modification of the rule of joint and 
several liability by exposing it to the possibility of jury nullification. 
This is especially true in cases such as Kaeo, where deep-pocket public 
or quasi-public entities are very often joined as parties in accident 
cases. This may have a much more significant impact on tort claims 
than recent "tort reform" legislation.288 On the other hand, however, 
Kaeo can be viewed as simply offsetting similar outcomes, often favor-
able to plaintiffs, where the court, as it is required to do "where 
appropriate," informs the jury of the effect of comparative negligence. 289 
What is sauce for plaintiffs should be sauce for the defendants. 29o 
5. Foreseeability and the Negligence Formula 
The case of Henderson v. Professional Coatings Corp., 291 is not only 
consistent with the view that the expansion of negligence has come to 
an end but may demonstrate a contraction of the negligence principle. 
There, the court held that summary judgment was correcdy granted 
to defendant on claims of both negligent entrustment and general 
negligence where plaintiff alleged that the defendant, who knew that 
one of his employees was an alcoholic, lent a company-rented auto-
mobile to that employee for likely use in going to a party with other 
employees, and that employee in turn allowed another intoxicated 
employee to use the automobile, resulting in a head-on collision with 
plaintiff. 292 
As the dissenters, Justices Padgett and Hayashi, correctly pointed 
out, the usual rule is that "[f]oreseeability is not to be measured by 
288 See, e.g., id. 
289 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31(d) (1985). Telling the jury how our modified 
comparative negligence statute works may cause the jury to distort its percentage 
findings in order to prevent a sympathetic plaintiffs percentage of negligence from 
being greater than 50% when compared to the total of all the negligence of the persons 
against whom recovery is sought. If the plaintiffs negligence is greater than 50%, she 
will recover nothing. !d., § 663-31. 
290 It is not clear that the court need give the clarifying instruction, even though 
requested, in all situations. Both the comparative negligence statute and the opinion 
in Kaeo provide that the instruction need only be given "where" (the statute) and 
"when" (Kaeo) appropriate. It is hoped that the courts will apply the requirement 
even-handedly. 
291 72 Haw. 387,819 P.2d 84 (1991) (Moon, J.). 
292 [d. at 388-90, 819 P.2d at 85-87. 
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what is more probable than not, but includes whatever is likely enough 
in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful man would 
take account of it in guiding practical conduct.' '293 The court, however, 
confused the question of what risks were foreseeable with the question 
of breach of duty for purposes of engaging in the negligence calculus: 
[W]e accept [plaintiff's] position that the issue is ... one of foreseea-
bility, that is, whether [owner] knew or should have known at the time 
he loaned the vehicle to persons such as [the alleged alcoholic], that [the 
alcoholic] would act unreasonably by loaning the vehicle to persons such 
as [another intoxicated person], who in turn would negligently operate 
the vehicle and cause injury to others. 294 
With all due respect, the correct approach would have been for the 
court to consider all of the reasonably foreseeable risks, great and 
small. These would have included the considerable risk that the person 
to whom the car was entrusted, admitted by defendant to be an 
alcoholic, might himself cause an accident while drunk and the lesser 
one that, if he were to get drunk, he might entrust the car to another 
intoxicated person who might cause an accident. The question then to 
be considered by the court on motion for summary judgment should 
have been whether a jury could find that in light of this bundle of 
foreseeable risks, the defendant's entrusting of the car created an 
unreasonable risk of harm. 295 The answer to this clearly seems to be 
yes. 296 
If the court intends in the future to consider, in determining whether 
conduct is negligent, only the very particular risk that caused the injury 
293 /d. at 413, 819 P.2d at 97 (Padgett, Hayashi, JJ., dissenting) (quoting 2 FOWLER 
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 18.2 at 1020 (1956». 
29< /d. at 399-400, 819 P.2d at 91. 
29> See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (the 
"Hand" formula). Cj Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 706 (1964): 
We see no reason why an actor engaging in conduct which entails a large risk 
of small damage and a small risk of other and greater damage, of the same 
general sort, from the same forces, and to the same class of persons, should be 
relieved of responsibility for the latter simply because the chance of its occurrence, 
if viewed alone, may not have been large enough to require the exercise of care. 
By hypothesis, the risk of the lesser harm was sufficient to render his disregard 
of it actionable; the existence of a less likely additional risk that the very forces 
against whose action he was required to guard would produce other and greater 
damage than could have been reasonably anticipated should inculpate him further 
rather than limit his liability. 
ld. at 725. 
296 See PROSSER, supra note 233, § 31 at 169-73. 
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rather than all the reasonably foreseeable risks created by the conduct, 
then the court is engaged in a substantial and unfortunate contraction 
of traditional negligence law. 
C. Products Liability 
With regard to the question whether the seller or manufacturer of a 
product should be held liable for injuries caused by manufacturing or 
design defects in its product, the Hawaii Supreme Court under Justice 
Lum has continued without significant hesitation to follow the pro-
claimant trend of its predecessor97 and of the California Supreme 
Court,298 at least in cases where the ultimate liability is likely to carry 
up the distributional chain to a large manufacturer. 
The most significant rulings of the court are these. 
(1) The plaintiff may join claims of negligence, including negligent 
manufacture, design or failure to warn, breach of implied warranty of 
fitness and merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code,299 
and claims of strict liability in tort, all arising out of the same facts, 
in a single product liability action. 300 
(2) The plaintiff need not prove that a defective product is "un-
reasonably dangerous" as § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
seemed to require. 301 Instead, it is enough if "the plaintiff demon-
strates that because of its manufacture or design, the product does 
not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer or 
user as to its safety. "302 
297 See, e.g., Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970) 
(Levinson, J.) (adopting strict products liability). "The public interest in human life 
and safety requires the maximum possible protection that the law can muster against 
dangerous defects in products." /d. at 74, 470 P. 2d at 243; see also Brown v. Clark 
Equipment Co., 62 Haw. 530,618 P.2d 267 (1980) (Kobayashi, J.), Kaneko v. Hilo 
Coast Processing, 65 Haw. 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982) (Ogata, J.). 
298 The end of that trend in California may be marked by Brown v. Superior Court, 
751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988), which held that strict liability for defective design does not 
apply to prescription drugs and that a manufacturer held liable under market share 
liability is only liable for the proportion of the total damages equal to its percentage 
share of the the relevant market. 
'99 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 490:2-314 (merchantability), 490:2-315 (fitness for particular 
purpose). The court's willingness to recognize these warranties along with strict liability 
in tort suggest that in an appropriate case the court will recognize an express warranty 
under the U.C.C. or under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B, as well. 
300 Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hospital, Inc., 66 Haw. 237, 659 P.2d 734 (1983) 
(Menor, J.). 
301 Section 402A of the Restal.emml imposed strict liability on "[olne who sells any product 
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(3) Even though the allegedly defective product is available for 
inspection, the plaintiff in a strict product liability case may use 
circumstantial evidence to establish a defect. 303 
(4) With regard to design defects, there are two alternative ways 
that a plaintiff may establish strict liability in tort. The first is the 
"consumer expectation test," described above. 304 The second is the 
most plaintiff-oriented and most controversial of all tests305 for lia-
bility for design defects: 
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer . . . ." The 
California Supreme Court eliminated the "unreasonably dangerous" -requirement on the 
ground that it sounded too much like negligence. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 
P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972). 
302 66 Haw. at 241, 659 P.2d at 739. In expressing its view that the "unreasonably 
dangerous" requirement need not be met, the court in Ontai said: 
[T]he plaintiff need not show that the article was dangerous to an extent beyond 
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases or uses 
it. . . . It is enough that the plaintiff demonstrates that because of its manufacture 
or design, the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary 
consumer or user as to its safety. 
!d. With all due respect, however, there does not seem to be any significant difference 
between the two statements: a product which "does not meet the reasonable expectations 
of the ordinary consumer or user as to its safety" and which would subject the seller to 
liability is necessarily more dangerous than ("dangerous to an extent beyond that") 
reasonably expected ("contemplated") by the ordinary consumer or user as to its safety. 
The only difference is that the requirement that the expectations be "reasonable" is not 
spelled out in the disapproVed phrase, although it may be inferred. 
303 Wakabayashi v. Hertz, 66 Haw. 265, 660 P.2d 1309 (1983) (Nakamura, J.). 
304 See supra note 300 and accompanying text. In adopting the consumer expectation test 
the court was following the Supreme Court of California in Barker v. Lull Engineering 
Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978). In Barker, the test is: "a product may be 
found defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the product failed to perform as 
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably 
foreseeable manner." This test has reference to the actual expectations of ordinary 
consumers or users, not necessarily to "reasonable expectations." The problem with that 
test, as the court itself noted in Barker, is that consumers may be led to have very low 
safety expectations for some products. [d. So long as the product meets those low 
expectations, there would be not liability under this test. That is one of the reasons the 
court in Barker found it necessary to formulate a second test not dependent upon consumer 
expectations. 
The Hawai'i test, which relates to "reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer," 
rather than the "ordinary expectations," might conceivably be interpreted to mean the 
amount of safety that the reasonable consumer has the right to expect. If it were to be so 
interpreted then, apart from the difficulties it might create, it would probably tum out in 
most cases to constitute a more plaintiff-oriented test than the Barker formulation. 
305 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over lHfense Product Design, 
63 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1979). 
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[A 1 product may alternatively be found defective in design if the 
plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design proximately caused his 
injury and the defendant fails to establish, in light of relevant factors, 
that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the 
risk of danger inherent in such design. 306 
Note that the plaintiff's case does not include proving that the design 
is defective; she need only prove more probably than not that the 
design proximately caused her injury. Thus, for example, if plaintiff 
were injured when the car in which she was a passenger skidded into 
a wall, she need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
she would have escaped such serious injury if the vehicle had been 
equipped with an airbag or an automatic braking system. In order to 
avoid liability, the difendant must then prove that the benefits of the design 
without the airbag, or without the automatic braking system, outweigh 
the risk of danger involved in not having either safety device. If 
defendant fails in his proof, the product is then deemed "defective" 
and the defendant held liable. This second test, calling for a risk-
benefit analysis, is similar to the so-called "Hand formula" 307 in a 
negligence case except that the burden is on the defendant rather than 
the plaintiff. 308 
306 Barker, 573 P.2d at 456 (emphasis added). 
307 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
308 Another difference between the tests is also the possibility that what the defendant 
knew or should have known about the risks of the design and the feasibility of an 
alternate design [state of the art) may not be relevant in the design defect case. See 
infra note 309 and accompanying text. 
It is not clear that the court in Ontai fully understood the implications of adopting 
the Barker tests, since the court said: 
Under either test, it would still be incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that 
the offending product was dangerously defective and the defect was the proximate 
cause of his injuries .... Ontai, in the present case, was thus required to show: 
(1) a defect in the footrest which rendered it dangerous for its intended or 
reasonably foreseeable use, and (2) a causal connection between the defect and 
his injuries. 
66 Haw. at 243, 659 P.2d at 740. Quite clearly, however, under the second test it is 
not "incumbent" on plaintiff to prove the product is dangerously defective. Rather, 
it is incumbent on the defendant to prove it is not defective. 
Any misunderstanding, however, was cleared up by Chief Justice Lum in his opinion 
in Masaki II. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 780 P.2d 566 (1989), where the court 
expressly approved a charge which shifted the burden to defendant based upon the 
second test in Barker. Masaki, 71 Haw. at 24-25, 780 P.2d at 579. 
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(5) In a products liability action based upon strict liability in tort, 
state of the art evidence is not admissible to establish, as a defense, 
that the the manufacturer did not know or should not have known of 
the danger inherent is its product. 309 
(6) In a negligence action brought against manufacturers of drugs, 
where the plaintiff is unable to identify which manufacturer provided 
the specific drug which caused plaintiff's harm, proportional liabilty 
based on the "market share" theory of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratorie.r1o is 
309 Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 69 Haw. 287, 740 P.2d 548 (1987) (Wakatsuki, 
J.). It is difficult to know what the brief opinion in this case means. The action was 
based upon injuries suffered from asbestos exposure in the workplace and included a 
claim for strict liability for a defective product and failure to warn of the danger. The 
question, certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, was 
worded in a way almost designed to elicit a negative response from a court committed 
to maintaining a separation between negligence and strict· liability: 
In a strict products liability case for injuries caused by an inherently unsafe 
product, is the manufacturer conclusively presumed to know the dangers inherent 
in his product, or is state of the art evidence admissible to establish' whether 
the manufacturer knew or through the exercise of reasonable human foresight 
should have known of the danger? 
!d. at 287, 740 P.2d at 549. 
In answering no, the court responded with the shibboleth that "in a strict liability 
action, [as opposed to a negligence action) the issue of whether the seller knew or 
reasonably should have known of the dangers inherent in his or her product is 
irrelevant to the issue of liability." 69 Haw. at 288, 740 P.2d at 549. (relying on 
Boudreau v. General Electric Co., 2 Haw. App. 10, 15, 625 P.2d 384, 389 (1981». 
However, reading the question very narrowly, the court refused to answer the question 
whether state of the art evidence might be relevant to the duty to warn claim, !d. at 
288 n.2, 740 P.2d at 549 n.2, and also left open the question "Whether or not state-
of-the-art evidence is probative of some other factor that is relevant in a strict product 
liability action (e.g., consumer expectations, which bears on whether a product is 
defective) and therefore admissible for that limited purpose .... " [d. at 289 n.3, 740 
P.2d at 549 n.3. Further, the court noted that this case involved a product that was 
inherently dangerous "not involving a manufacturing defect nor a design defect .... " 
!d. at 288 n.1, 740 P.2d at 549 n.1. 
Rather than being an extremely liberal ruling restricting use of state-of-the-art 
evidence, therefore, the decision may simply be read as reflecting an aversion to the 
use of negligence language in a strict liability case. On the other hand, the court in 
passing remarked that "our analysis makes defendant's knowledge of the dangers 
irrelevant in a strict liability action . . . ." and cited, using the ambiguous "if." 
signal, the controversial New Jersey case which disallowed state-of-the-art evidence in 
a product liability case, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 
544 n.3 (N.J. 1982), subsequently limited to itsfacts by Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 
479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984). 
310 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), em. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). 
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allowed. 311 In so holding the Supreme Court acknowledged the need 
to "fairly deal with the plight of plaintiffs who are unable to identify, 
for no fault of their own, the person or entity who should bear the 
liability for their injury. "312 
By way of contrast with these unmitigated pro-claimant cases and 
holdings, the court refused to extend strict liability in tort to conditions, 
such as a towel bar in a hotel bathroom that would not support the 
weight of a woman313 and a cracked, non-shatter-proof plate glass 
shower door that caused injury to plaintiff's hand,314 where the defen-
dants were not the manufacturers or distributors of the product but 
were the owner or lessor of the premises in which the condition existed. 
The court's rationale for refusing to extend strict liability to these 
situations was that the usual reasons and policies which support strict 
liability, as in the cases described above, were not present in these 
311 Smith v. Cutter Biological Inc., 72 Haw. 416,823 P.2d 717 (1991) (Lum, C.J.). 
The court in Smith went further than the California Supreme Court in Sindell. Plaintiff 
was a hemophiliac who became HIV positive by ingesting "Factor VIII" or "AHF," 
a blood protein extracted from donated blood which enables the blood to coagulate 
when a hemophiliac suffers a bleeding episode. /d. at 421-22, 823 P.2d at 721. Unlike 
the DES in Sindell, the drug in this case was not fungible with the Factor VIII sold 
by each defendant, since each defendant's product was compounded from blood taken 
from different donors. 
In overruling defendant's summary judgment, the court also held that Hawai'i's 
blood shield law, HAW. REV. STAT. § 327-51 (1985), while precluding a strict liability 
action, does not preclude a negligence action based on "market share" liability even 
though the statute provides that defendant shall only remain liable for "its own 
negligence." 72 Haw. at 423, 823 P.2d at 722 (construing HAW. REV. STAT. § 327-
51 (1985) (emphasis added). 
Justice Moon vigorously dissented, asserting that the blood shield statute precluded 
the market share action; that even if the market share action was available, this was 
an inappropriate case because defendants' products were not fungible; and that, in 
any event, there was insufficient evidence of duty and breach of duty to sustain 
plaintiff's claims of negligence, a question which the majority left open for subsequent 
determination. /d. at 453-54, 823 P.2d at 736-37. 
It is interesting that neither the majority nor the dissent cited Brown v. Superior 
Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988), in which the California Supreme Court limited 
liability under the market share theory of Sindell to proportional liability-each defen-
dant joined only being held liable for a percentage of plaintiff's damages equal to the 
defendant's market share-and also held that strict liability in tort does not apply to 
drug manufacturers. /d. at 486. 
312 72 Haw. at 428, 823 P.2d at 724. 
313 Bidar v. Amfac, Inc., 66 Haw. 547, 669 P.2d 154 (1983) (Nakamura, J.). 
31+ Armstrong v. Cione, 69 Haw. 176, 738 P.2d 79 (1987) (Lum, C.J.). 
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cases. 3J5 An additional reason given in Armstrong, of some interest in 
assessing the court's attitude to expansion of liability, was that the 
defendant "cannot adjust the costs of protecting the consumer up the 
chain of distribution"316 but must instead charge the costs "down the 
chain of distribution"317 to those who rent from the defendant. In cases 
such as these, application of strict liability might have caused increases 
in hotel rates or in rent, matters of particular concern in Hawai'i. 
D. Damages 
Two extremely important rulings on damages emerged from a single 
decision, Masaki v. General Motors Corp. ,318 in 1989, one favoring the 
defendants, the other favoring claimants. First, the court held that the 
burden of proving punitive damages is elevated to "clear and con-
vincing evidence. "319 In view of the United States Supreme Court's 
refusal to hold that punitive damages violate the United States Con-
stitution,320 the elevation of the burden of proof may take on consid-
erable importance, particularly in the settlement process. It should 
henceforth become at least somewhat more difficult for a claimant to 
extract an inflated settlement because of exaggerated fear of an award 
of punitive damages based On the fact that the right· to such damages 
need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Of even greater importance, however, is the court's approval, also 
in Masaki, of the controversial element of damages known as filial 
m ld. at 184, 738 P.2d at 84. Of particular interest is the court's acceptance of the 
Intermediate Court of Appeals' reasoning in Messier v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners 
of Mt. Terrace, 6 Haw. App. 525, 535, 735 P.2d 939, 947-48 (1987) (Heen, J.): 
"Withholding the rule will not measurably depreciate [plaintiffs) thances of obtaining 
compensation for his injuries," and "[h)e does not face the kind of difficulty in 
proving [defendants') negligence ... as is faced by plaintiffs in other cases where the 
doctrine of strict products liability has been applied." 69 Haw. at 184, 738 P.2d at 
84. 
316 69 Haw. at 185, 738 P.2d at 84. 
mId. 
318 71 Haw. 1, 780 P.2d 566 (1989) (Lum, C.J.). 
319 /d. at 16-17, 780 P.2d at 575. 
3,. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, __ U.S. __ , 111 S.Ct. 1032 
(1991). 
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consortium-parents' damages for loss of the comfort, care, and services 
of a child.321 Even the California Supreme Court, in Baxter v. Superior 
Court,322 declined to extend the archaic common law action by a parent 
for the loss of services of a minor child to allow recovery for loss of 
the love, comfort, companionship, and society of the child. 323 The 
Hawaii Supreme Court, however, noting that such damages were 
allowed by statute in cases of wrongful death,324 held that parents could 
bring a common law action for similar damages based upon the 
negligence of a manufacturer in causing a non-fatal injury to their 
child, in this case a 28-year-old adult.325 
In his opinion, Chief Justice Lum adopted the reasoning of the 
Arizona Supreme Court in Frank v. Superior Court,326 which noted "no 
meaningful distinction can be drawn between death and severe injury 
where the effect on consortium is concerned. "327 Further, in rejecting 
the tie between the common law action for loss of a child's services-
which limited recovery to loss of the child's earnings until majority-
and this action for loss of society, companionship and love of an adult 
child, the Masaki court said: 
It is irrelevant that parents are not entitled to the services of their adult 
children; they continue to enjoy a legitimate and protectible expectation 
of consortium beyond majority arising from the very bonds of the family 
relationship. Surely nature recoils from the suggestion that the society, 
companionship and love which compose fUial consortium automatically 
fade upon emancipation .... 328 
This decision, in its boldness and in its effect, is similar to and 
reminiscent of the Richardson Court's landmark opinion in Rodrigues 
v. State,329 allowing the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
321 71 Haw. at 19, 780 P.2d at 576. 
322 563 P.2d 871 (Cal. 1977). 
323 !d. at 874. 
32+ HAW. REV. STAT. § 633-3 (1972, as amended). 
325 71 Haw. at 22, 780 P.2d at 578. 
326 722 P.2d 955 (Ariz. 1986). 
327 !d. at 957-58. Of course one significant distinction is that both the action and 
damages in death cases are provided for by statute while the action and damages in 
a negligence action are not. The court's reason for extending the right to similar 
damages in a negligence action may therefore be based on an equal protection 
argument, an independent policy argument justifying such extension, or both. The 
court, however, did not specifically address this issue. 
328 !d.; see also Masalci, 71 Haw. at 21-22, 780 P.2d at 577-78. 
329 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (Richardson, C.J.). 
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Indeed, because the court in Masaki held that the parents may recover 
for negligent infliction as well as for loss of consortium, one wishes the 
court had spoken to the issue of which damages allowable under the 
loss of consortium claim do, and which do not, overlap the damages 
allowable in the mental distress claim. Surely, the mental distress 
engendered by learning of the son's serious injuries includes elements 
of distress which will be difficult, if not impossible, to separate from 
the mental element which composes loss of love, comfort, companion-
ship and society. 
Masaki also implies that actions for loss of parental consortium will 
also be allowed. In a footnote the court stated: 
In Halberg v. Young, 41 Haw. 634 (1957), we followed the traditional 
common-law rule and held that no cause of action exists in favor of a 
child for injuries sustained by his parents. Appellants claim that our 
decision in Halberg is dispositive of the instant case because a parent's 
claim for the lost consortium of a child is merely the reciprocal of a 
child's claim for the lost consortium of his parents. While we recognize 
that the two actions are analogous in many respects, the issue of parental 
consortium is not before us today. 330 
Nevertheless, since is it is really not possible on principled grounds to 
distinguish the right to filial consortium for injury to an adult child 
from the right to parental consortium, the likely effect of Masaki is to 
overturn Halberg. 
III. CONCLUSION 
As the Richardson Court had done in its time, so too has the Lum 
Court, in its own time, responded to concerns expressed in the com-
munity. This the Lum Court has done by addressing problems of 
insurance availability and affordability, while tending to continue to 
afford generous protection of victims in areas, such as products liability, 
where local community concerns are muted. Products liability aside, 
the court seems increasingly, if not consistently, to follow a path which 
protects local economic interests-businesses in the visitor industry, the 
State, and purchasers of no-fault and liability insurance-from costs 
that might be generated by a consistently liberal expansion of tort 
liability and insurance coverage. 
330 71 Haw. at 19 n.B, 7BO P.2d at 576 n.B. 
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First, with regard to the law of strict products liability, there has 
been no inclination to do anything but to continue the liberal trend of 
the Richardson Court, to consolidate its pro-victim approach, and to 
proceed even beyond the farthest reaches of the "mentor" court-the 
Supreme Court of California-which has recently backed off continued 
expansion of strict liability. While product liability actions often have 
local suppliers and distributors as parties, however, the ultimate re-
sponsibility for damages and the major costs of litigation will almost 
always land on manufacturers located outside of Hawai'i. Evidently, 
the court can therefore benefit local victims with relatively little direct 
or immediate impact on local enterprises or on local insurance rates. 331 
In other areas, the evidence of continued liberalism is more sparse. 
The expansion of liability for loss of fllial consortium332 is dramatic 
and important, but is not matched by other pro-victim decisions. 
Decisions in which the court overturned jury instructions which ap-
peared to restrict the definition of negligence are pro-plaintiff, and at 
least one of them could lead to the award of damages in cases where 
proof of negligence is weak,333 but they are not of overarching signif-
icance. More important, perhaps, is the decision to uphold a duty of 
an innkeeper to protect a guest from criminal behavior. 334 This case 
does not seem unduly to extend the negligence principle. 
By way of contrast, cases that have imposed restrictions or limits on 
victim-favoring common law rules seem to predominate. These include 
cases requiring that proof of punitive damages be made by clear and 
convincing evidence,335 restricting the expansion of liability of liquor 
sellers,336 denying recovery for the negligent serving of alcoholic bev-
erages by a social host,337 approving the liability-limiting Firefighter's 
Rule,338 holding that the State has no duty to warn or protect against 
criminal behavior in state parks,339 narrowing the foreseeability concept 
m This may be another reason, in addition to the differences among product liability 
laws among the states, why product liability reform will have to take place, if at all, 
at the federal level. There, any negative effects of strict liability on American enterprise 
in the international arena are likely to be more clearly evident. 
332 See supra note 318 and accompanying text. 
333 See supra part II. B.4. 
334 See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
'" See supra note 318 and accompanying text. 
336 See supra part B. 2. 
'" See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
338 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
". See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
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by focusing on only one of several risks created by defendant's behavior 
in determining whether defendant was negligent in entrusting a vehicle 
to an alcoholic,34() and allowing the judge in "appropriate" cases to 
inform the jury of the effect of joint and several liability. 341 
The insurance cases on balance seem to reflect a picture in which 
important protections to consumers have been provided and availability 
of some coverage has usually been assured, but where, for the most 
part, bold interpretations which would expand coverage have been 
rejected and the amount of insurance available in particular cases has 
been restricted even though the applicable language might easily have 
carried a more expansive interpretation. 
It will thus be noted that the tort and insurance opinions of the 
Lum Court do not reveal a consistent and monolithic philosophy either 
with regard to jurisprudence or social policy. This is not an introspective 
court, and the justices-perhaps because the caseload is too heavy and 
the justices too few, or perhaps because it is their inclination-do not 
dwell in lengthy opinions on the underpinnings of their decisions. 
Rather, they tend to be relatively terse and pragmatic. On this court, 
the views of individual justices with strong feelings also seem to have 
carried great weight. Frank Padgett, who has left the court, was such 
a justice. His views most often favored the victims of accidents. Ronald 
Moon is also such a justice. He has clearly favored a policy of reducing 
insurance costs and has often carried the court in a conservative 
direction. There are now two additions to Hawai'i's five-person court, 
Justices Robert Klein and Steven Levinson. It is pure speculation 
whether the now considerable influence of Justice Moon will continue 
to set the direction of the court in the area of torts and related 
Insurance. 
Addressing the question of tort reform in a common law court, it is 
clear from the decisions of the Lum Court as here described that so 
far, the Hawaii Supreme Court, not the Hawaii Legislature, has been 
the major player in tort reform in Hawai'i. 342 Whether the Supreme 
Court, supposedly the "least dangerous branch, "343 has recognized and 
acted upon the popular will, readers will have to decide for them-
selves.344 
340 See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
34' See supra note 282 and accompanying text. 
342 See irifra EpilogUe. 
34' ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) . 
... Cj Warren A. Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective? 41 HARV. L. REV. 1 
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Like Hawai'i's community, the Supreme Court is composed of 
diverse individuals with their own personal histories, political views, 
predispositions, and perspectives. Yet the justices all have strong ties 
to, and a common membership in the community. It is through this 
link to the community that the court responds to and reflects the temper 
and needs of its time. 
EPILOGUE 
At the end of April, 1992, as this article was about to go to press, 
the Hawaii Legislature passed bills revising the Hawai'i motor vehicle 
insurance laws which increased the amount of mandatory no-fault 
insurance, on the one hand, but raised the medical-rehablIitative limit, 
reduced the amount of required liability insurance, and eliminated 
automatic stacking of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, 
on the other hand. 345 These changes, produced in large measure by 
political pressure to reduce premiums brought to bear by the Coalition 
for Automobile Insurance Reform, may indeed demonstrate a new 
activism on the part of the Hawaii legislature in the area of tort and 
insurance reform reflecting, in turn, a new attitude on the part of the 
wider community. 
(1927): 
The lawyer cannot determine that our rules of liability for negligence are either 
just or unjust, unless he has first discovered what the community desires (which 
determines justice for the time and place), and whether the rules are adapted 
to satisfying those desires (which I assume to be the end of law). 
/d. at 19. 
m See H:R. 3974 (H.D. 1 and S.B. 2361, S.D. 2 (as amended, 1992», 16th Leg., 
1992, Reg. Sess. (1992), reprinted in 1992 Haw. __ j. __ . 
